



# ***JPRS Report—***

# **Central Eurasia**

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***Military Affairs***

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# Central Eurasia

## Military Affairs

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## CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

### Shchit Cochairman on 'Renewed' Organization

93UM0211A Moscow KURANTY in Russian

13 Nov 92 p 7

[Interview with Nikolay Mikhaylovich Moskovchenko, one of three cochairmen of Shchit, an organization for servicemen, by Vladimir Nazarov: "Shchit" Is Giving Up the Sword"]

[Text] I was in the company of servicemen. The conversation was about something vital: about the difficult situation in which officers, warrant officers, and their families find themselves, and about the fact that there is no organization that would defend the rights of the military. An elderly colonel, a doctor of sciences and a professor, let drop a phrase that perplexed not only me: "Shchit" [Shield] is giving up the sword."

Everyone began to laugh. Including me, a strictly civilian person. Indeed, it is not at all necessary to be a serviceman to have your ears ring just at the mention of Shchit, an organization whose chartered task is "the defense of servicemen, military reservists, and members of their families." Thunder and lightning have shaken every Shchit measure—big or small. And it seemed to me in general that the name of the union by no means reflects the mood, concerns, and methods of work of the Shchit leaders.

"Sword" is a much more appropriate name for the union. Shchit members struck everyone down one after another—both the just and the guilty. It is impossible to list all of the scandals associated with this organization. Remember how, before the eyes of millions of television viewers, an attempt was made to evict People's Deputy Vitaliy Urazhtsev, one of the founders and the first chairman of Shchit, from the hall where the officers' meeting of the country was being held. But he, the uninvited guest, only moved his mighty shoulders a bit, as if saying: I graduated not only from the military political academy, but also from the airborne school. Or: Urazhtsev's closest associate tried to knock out the military commandant of Moscow. But later lawyers, journalists, and military and civilian personalities considered the question for a long time—whether to lock up or to free the intrepid major of the reserve. What is the point of the story with the committee of soldiers' mothers! It was established on the initiative of Shchit, and later it was almost cursed by the organizers themselves.

Scandals, scandals.... Very recently, the newspapers considered one more scandal: Urazhtsev against the GAI [state automobile inspection]. Or the other way round: GAI against Urazhtsev. These scandals, like smoke pots, closely concealed Shchit's positive activity from outside eyes. If it existed. Try to establish, even under the accompaniment of a cannonade, the utility coefficient of this union. But it, judging by everything, has had very little....

So what stood behind the puzzling phrase of the colonel that Shchit is giving up the sword? V. Urazhtsev's resignation? The newspapers, including KURANTY, reported that Vitaliy Georgiyevich was dismissed from the leading post at the Shchit congress. But, as before, Urazhtsev calls himself

the chairman of the union. Although with less force. New concerns appeared: V. Urazhtsev planned one more campaign—for the position of mayor of Moscow....

Well then, fine, we will shift to Shchit. In front of me is a document signed by the deputy minister of justice of Russia. The registration of the Shchit union is written in black and white. But this means that the recently held congress was authorized to elect the leading organ, of which V. Urazhtsev was not a part. The congress eliminated the position of chairman completely, replacing it with three cochairmen. They are: Lieutenant Colonel of the Reserve Ivan Bychkov, Major of the Reserve Venyamin Turchin, and Major of the Reserve Nikolay Moskovchenko, whom I asked to talk about the activity of the renewed Shchit. But first about its tasks.

[N. Moskovchenko] The defense of rights and freedoms and assistance in the resolution of the socioeconomic problems of servicemen and members of their families. Decisive counteraction to efforts to use the Armed Forces in functions that are illegal or not unique to them. Rendering personal assistance in the defense of the rights of servicemen and job placement upon their discharge into the reserve....

[Nazarov] Tell me, Nikolay Mikhaylovich, to what extent are there grounds to the rumors about Shchit's new principles of work?

[Moskovchenko] Well, we reject senseless and at times even damaging confrontation with the Ministry of Defense. Confrontation for any reason and without a reason. Cooperation is far more fruitful. Incidentally, our congress took place in the Central House of the Soviet Army imeni M.V. Frunze—that is the way the Ministry of Defense reacted to our peaceful initiatives. This by no means signifies that we will permit ourselves to be put down. As before, Shchit is an opposition organization.

[Nazarov] Do you have any common tasks with the Ministry of Defense?

[Moskovchenko] Of course. For example, the building of a principally new Army on a voluntary basis....

[Nazarov] But are the generals solidly behind recruitment?

[Moskovchenko] Life compels the establishment of a new Army—not large in numerical strength, mobile, and well trained and equipped. But without the help of the Ministry of Defense, we will really be unable to inaugurate cadet corps in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and possibly in other cities as well. This idea was supported by Anatoliy Sobchak, and by the Moscow authorities also.

[Nazarov] What have you succeeded in doing?

[Moskovchenko] We have conducted sociological research. It identified two main problems of the Army: housing, or more accurately, the lack of it, and legal excesses; that is, the direct bondage of the serviceman to the commander. Previously, the political organs, although they compromised themselves pretty well, could be a counterweight to a commander's foolishness. Today, even this institution does not exist. Today's Army most of all needs a law on the status

of the serviceman, and we will do everything possible so that it becomes a shield for soldiers and officers.

[Nazarov] Nikolay Mikhaylovich, a lieutenant colonel recently called the editorial office and said: Soldiers are building a dacha for the son-in-law of a marshal in Archangelskiy Rayon near Moscow....

[Moskovchenko] That is the order of things today. The powers that be in the Army are grabbing everything that is allowed and that is not allowed. The agony....

[Nazarov] Do you not regard the generals with favor....

[Moskovchenko] Our citizens should look into those who rule destinies in the Army. They even differ outwardly from those whom we see on television screens: A. Rutskoy, P. Grachev, Ye. Shaposhnikov. Walk through the corridors of the Ministry of Defense. Some generals squeeze sideways through a folding door. The officers laugh: A three-kilometer cross-country race should be set up for them. And leave those in the Army who reach the finish line at least on the fifth day, and discharge the rest.... Add to this the fact that a majority of the generals profess the religion of Yazov and Makashov. What is a dacha that is being built by soldiers for a son-in-law! We have information that a pile of generals intend to privatize the military store. Of course, we will not remain silent. We will not stand aside. Able to help officers with the most difficult problem—apartments?

[Moskovchenko] In Moscow alone, there are now 9,000 military pensioners without apartments. Imagine how many years will pass before they receive housing in the present situation. Shchit requested the government of Moscow: Give us land. We have found investors who are ready to invest large sums of money in the construction of homes for the military, receiving for this only the first floors as offices. I think that the project is beneficial for everyone—for the city fathers and for the military.

[Nazarov] Shchit is becoming like a trade union....

[Moskovchenko] The Army needs a real trade union. But the upper Army echelons, headed by Minister of Defense P. Grachev, are furiously opposed. It is impossible, they say, to transform the Army into a kolkhoz. It is customary to agree with this conclusion. Apparently, because a majority of fellow citizens do not know: Military trade unions exist and operate successfully in armies of virtually all civilized states. In Europe alone, there are 18 such unions, united into a single organization—Euromil. And believe me: Not one of the marshals of these armies would be able to employ soldiers as a free work force. I am confident: We will have a trade union here as well. In any case, the next congress of Euromil will be held in Moscow in the autumn of next year.

[Nazarov] Nikolay Mikhaylovich, but, after all, Army trade unions will render Shchit unnecessary....

[Moskovchenko] We will see what we will see. And if we feel that Shchit is no longer needed—we will disband by ourselves.

These, then, are the plans of the renewed Shchit. Would that they would come true. The leaders would not be drawn again to the unsheathed sword, sounding off, causing a fuss, scandals....

We will see what we will see, Shchit cochairman Nikolay Moskovchenko says in such cases.

This material was prepared for the press when suddenly a report appeared in the mass media that a congress....of Shchit is being held in Moscow. As a congress? Again? Immediately after the registration of the organization by the Ministry of Justice of Russia? It was necessary to turn to N. Moskovchenko for an explanation. Here is what he said:

"The problem is that Vitaliy Urazhtsev does not want to resign himself to the fact that he no longer leads the union. Undoubtedly, the meeting that he conducted on 10 October was in no way a congress of the Shchit union. The fact is simply that Vitaliy Georgiyevich's hand is once again drawn to the sword....

#### Contract Service System Outlined

*93UM0242A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY  
in Russian No 48, Dec 92 p 8*

[Response to reader's letter by R. Bykov, associate of the Ministry of Defense Press Center]

[Text] Nowadays there is a lot of talk about the contract method of recruitment into the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Could you tell us more details about the contract service system: How long will the contract last and what will be its conditions?

[Signed] B. Klementyev, Tula

The question is answered by an associate of the Ministry of Defense Press Center, R. Bykov.

Young men who have reached draft age, military servicemen on regular duty who have served for no less than six months, reservists under 40 years of age, unmarried, childless women from 19 to 40 years of age, and also wives of military servicemen (except those with children of preschool age) may be accepted into the service under contract.

A contract is signed between the unit (ship) commander and the individual accepted into the service for two to three years and it may be extended for three, five, or 10 years.

The government of the Russian Federation has already adopted a decision concerning financing the beginning of the recruitment for military service under contract in 1992. Individuals accepted into the military service under contract (warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted personnel) are to be paid monetary salaries of 3,710 rubles [R] to R10,127 per month (depending on the specialty they have chosen). Under special conditions it will be up to R18,535 per month. Thus upon entry into the service under contract, marksmen in the infantry will have a salary of R3,710, airborne troops—R4,452, gunner-radio operators in the Air Force—R4,823, and hydroacoustics technicians on nuclear submarines—R6,567. Additionally, there are increments to the monetary pay: for length of service—up to 25 percent, for service in remote regions—up to 100

percent, for grade—up to 10 percent. The annual leave is from 30 to 45 days. All military servicemen accepted into the military service under contract are provided with housing (depending on the composition of their families).

At the present time measures are being taken to shift to the mixed method of staffing the Armed Forces. The transition to this method of staffing with personnel should be conducted in three stages corresponding in time to the stages of the reformation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (during the period from 1992 through 1999). In the first stage they are to prepare a legislative act and organizational documents, and beginning in 1992 they are to recruit volunteers for military service under contract. In the second stage there will be a practical transition to this method of staffing the Armed Forces. And in 1995 the number accepted under contract should amount to 30 percent of the overall number of military servicemen. In the third stage the ratio should be as follows: 50 percent under contract and 50 percent through the draft.

#### Siberian MD Begins Professionalization

93UM0197B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 1 Dec 92 p 2

[Unattributed report under the "From Our Newsroom" rubric: "Siberian MD Professionalization Under Way"]

[Text] The Siberian Military District Military Council has reached a decision regarding initiation of Army contract service. The Siberian MD Press Center reports that as of 1 December military unit commanders and military commissariats are already starting to select professional-duty personnel from conscripts and volunteers. While written for a three-year tour of duty, the contracts may be extended upon completion of that term. The requirements to be met by volunteers are quite demanding, in that the latter must enjoy an excellent state of health and offer high qualifications.

#### NGF Chief Protests Harassment of Soldiers, Families in Poland

93UM0198C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 2 Dec p 3

[News report by Mikhail Kireyev: "Attack on Security Gates of Russian Army"]

[Text] On the eve of a widely observed Catholic holiday in Poland, the Feast St. Andrew, a group of Polish youth attacked the gates of the military garrisons of the Russian army at the Legnitz garrison, where the staff of the Northern group of forces is stationed. Rocks were thrown at buildings. Family members of Russian servicemen, trying to get onto the grounds of the residential areas, were subjected to harassment and taunts. As a result of the hooliganism, significant material damage was done to the property of the Northern Group of Forces.

In connection with the incident, a government official of the Russian Federation for affairs of the Russian Troops in Poland, Commander of the NGF Col.-Gen. L. Kovalev lodged a sharp protest with the president of the city of Legnitz, Mr. E. Yaroshevich, and called his attention to the

need to take effective steps to protect the honor, health and safety of service members of the Northern Group of Forces.

#### Willingness of Kuban Cossacks to Serve in Transcaucasus MD

93UM0216A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
5 Dec 92 p 2

[Article by Lt Col Leonid Pozdeyev under the rubric "The Transcaucasus Military District: Who Will Enter the Ranks Tomorrow?"; "The Cossacks Have Said 'OK'"]

[Text] The fact that the visit by representatives of the administration of Krasnodar Kray, the reemerging Kuban Cossacks and the Women's Council of the All-Kuban Cossack Army to units of the ZakVO [Transcaucasus Military District] coincided with the regular induction period was no accident. For many years, after all, right up until the Cossack Army was eliminated, Cossacks of the Kuban and Terek were an irregular component of the Caucasus Army, the commander in chief of which was simultaneously appointed ataman of the Kuban and Terek Cossack armies. On the other hand, public opinion is against sending Russians to hot spots today (not long ago, incidentally, the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers of Krasnodar Kray submitted a demand to that effect to the president). The press has turned all of the Transcaucasus into a hot spot.

The latter is not consistent with the truth. Karabakh represents far from all of Azerbaijan; Abkhazia and South Ossetia represent far from all of Georgia. And, by the way, there is not a single subunit of the ZakVO in a real hot spot. The opinion has taken shape, as they say, however. So, what are the Cossacks to do? Revive the tradition? Or refrain for now?

During the trip the Kuban people saw for themselves that despite a large number of benefits for first-term servicemen in the Transcaucasus (a soldier receives more than 2,000 rubles, for example, in certain places augmented "hot-spot" rations, and so forth), the situation with respect to manning the units with enlisted men is a difficult one. The barracks are barely one-third full. Some of the units have only 20-30 soldiers. Majors serve as corporals of the guard, lieutenants as sentries. At the firing range in Akhalkalaki female military personnel are in the majority, and Col. Yuriy Kovalenko, commander of the formation, simply throws up his hands and says: "What can you do when there are around 360 members of the fair sex in shoulder boards and far fewer enlisted men. The situation in the division commanded by Maj Gen Babkin is somewhat better.

The delegation also met one of their own. Boris Yakovlevich, father of Sgt Nikolay Katkalo, had come from the village of Novo-Cherdynovka in Krasnodar Kray to see his son. He could see that his son was o.k. and the service conditions were not bad, but the trip cost him 6,000. Upon learning this, the district command assured the visitors that if Krasnodar youth would come there to serve, they would provide regular military transportation to Kuban, so that the parents do not have to spend all their money, plus a military line on which parents and relatives can telephone any unit.

In general, everything was completely cleared up for the delegation, and Aleksandr Babkov, field ataman of the All-Kuban Cossack Army, announced that "Cossacks will serve in the Caucasus." Viktor Staroverov, representative of the kray administration, promised that a green light would be given to the assignment of Cossacks to the Transcaucasus Military District.

Despite these constructive announcements, however, it is not possible right now to guarantee that Kuban men will be drafted for the Transcaucasus. A youth (and his parents) must agree for him to serve in hot spots, as we know, but that is not enough. The military commissariat must also have a so-called firm schedule of replenishments.

This is what Maj Vladimir Tolstenev, representative of the Krasnodar Kray Military Commissariat, had to say about the situation: Under the fall draft plan he needs to send to the ZakVO... 20 men. And so, even after Cossacks have given the "o.k." for their children to serve in the Transcaucasus, Russia's Ministry of Defense still has the final say.

#### Denial of Executions by MVD Troops

*93UM0216B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 5 Dec 92 p 2*

[Article by Lt Col Vladimir Kudryashov, officer with the Internal Troops, under the rubric "A Rejoinder": "It Would Have Been Easy to Learn This Prior to Publication"]

[Text] I read the article "Invitation to an Execution" in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, (Issue No. 45 for this year). The unnamed author attempts to open the curtain to the secret of secrets: Who carries out death sentences? And how?

"Some people assert that several people from the Internal Troops of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] do the shooting (of those sentenced to death—V.K.)." This is a literal quote: "Five servicemen are given four carbines with live ammunition and one with blanks. No one knows who has which. They do count the holes in the body afterwards, however. Death is certified by a doctor...."

"Some people assert," the author writes, giving no thought to the feelings of the parents of sons serving in the Internal Troops. To put the minds of the soldiers' mothers at ease and clear up all of the questions, let us turn to people knowledgeable in this matter.

Col of Internal Service Gennadiy Oreshkin, chief of the Butyrskiy Investigative Isolation Prison in the city of Moscow:

"The internal Troops have nothing to do with carrying out death sentences."

"Col Stanislav Korovinskiy, service chief in the Main Directorate of the Commander of Internal Troops (GUKVV) of the Russian Federation's MVD:

"This function has never been assigned to our servicemen...."

Maj Sergey Belentyev, officer with the armaments service of the GUKVV of Russia's MVD:

"Our personnel have no carbines in their arsenals at all."

#### Roundup on Progress of Draft

*93UM0229A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
9 Dec 92 p 1*

[Unattributed Article: "The Spring Draft Is Proceeding With Difficulty: Will the New Law Take Effect?"]

[Text] For many years we regarded military service as a sacred duty. And looking at the matter without bias, it should be honestly admitted that the vast majority of Russians have indeed always considered the fulfillment of military duty to be something sacred. Times are different, though. Today, more and more of the youth consider military work to lack prestige or at least to be something undesirable for them. More than enough is being said and written about this turn in the public mind. The situation is not changing substantially, however. This fall the military commissariats implementing the induction have encountered the same problems as in the spring draft. Unfortunately, the law on military duty and military service was passed belatedly and is not yet affecting the course of the draft. This is borne out by our correspondents in various regions of Russia.

Col Yevgeniy Aravin, chief of the department of civilian preparation for the draft in the Organizational and Mobilizational Directorate of the PriVO [Volga Military District], told Lt Col Oleg Bedula, our correspondent, how the military draft is going in the republics and oblasts of the Volga Military District.

"This fall's induction is turning out to be complicated and difficult. As of 5 December only slightly more than 25 percent of the youth who received notices from the military commissariats had left for the forces. It is already clear that the plan will not be completely met. The shortfall amounts to approximately 5,000 men.

"There are various reasons. The prime and main one, however, is the fact that a considerable number of the youth maliciously evade the draft. There are 1,786 draft-dodgers in Tartarstan, 259 in the Republic of Komi and 964 in Samara Oblast. A general shortage of draft reserves is also making itself felt.

"Nonetheless, certain progress has been noted since the district military council appealed to the leadership of the republics and oblasts. The Presidium of the VS [Supreme Soviet] of the Republic of Bashkortostan, for example, has passed an edict titled "On Increasing the Responsibility of Citizens and Officials for Violations of the Rules Governing Military Registration." It specifies, among other things, that a fine equalling five times the minimum wage is to be levied for failure of a recruit to report to the rayon or city military commissariat within a three-day period. The Minor Soviet of Saratov Oblast has decided that a fine in the amount of the minimum wage will be levied upon a recruit for the first failure to report to the commission and as much as five times the minimum wage for the second, and criminal charges are filed for the third. Fines are already being levied upon "dodgers" in the Republic of Komi and Perm Oblast. The Samara Oblast administration has allocated 4 million rubles to finance the draft.

"Unfortunately, however, in practically all of the republics and oblasts there are cases in which doctors on the medical commissions of the military commissariats unjustifiably classify recruits as unfit for military service for reasons of health. This has been confirmed by subsequent checks by the district military-medical commission and in the process of certifying hypochondriacs in hospitals."

The same kind of problems are being encountered in Siberia. The kray assembly site in the city of Barnaul is crowded today, for example. The number of recruits summoned there from the cities and rayons of Altay Kray for assignments in the Russian army is growing. This still does not mean, however, that everyone sent notices by the military commissariats joins the military team.

In an interview with Maj Gen Vladimir Yegorov, Altay Kray's military commissar, he told Maj Aleksandr Beklich, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, that he worries about the state of health of the future soldiers. At the present time every fourth recruit is deemed unfit to serve in the forces or is sent for further medical examination. The kray military commissar believes that this is a result of inferior medical certification of the youth when they register for military service.

This is not the only problem encountered by officers with the Altay Kray Military Commissariat as they have conducted the fall draft, however. Not every group formed up at the assembly site can be sent into the forces promptly. The schedule breaks down due to shortcomings in the scheduling of rail transport. During the last two days of November alone three groups of recruits from Altay Kray were held up a couple of days at the assembly site due to negligence on the part of railway workers.

Despite this, it is the opinion of Vladimir Pushkarev, chief of the directorate at the headquarters of the SibVO [Siberian Military District], that there are no cases of resistance to the induction of youth for the Russian army on the part of local authorities or any public organizations. The increasing frequency of evasion of the draft by the recruits themselves under various pretexts is the cause of greatest concern. Every tenth conscript in Siberia as a whole fails to report to the induction commission at the notice from the military commissariat. The military commissariats file charges against them with the prosecutor's office. The absence of a precise system of accountability for evading the draft in the current law prevents the "dodgers" from being brought to strict account, however. We know of only a few cases in Siberia in which draft-dodgers have been given what they deserve.

According to the SibVO staff, the induction is proceeding with the greatest difficulty in Kemerovo and Omsk oblasts and the Republic of Tuva. In the latter, incidentally, parents of conscripts have recently been adding fuel to the fire. According to Col Vladimir Kozlov, the republic's military commissar, the parents are demanding with increasing persistence that their sons not be assigned outside the borders of Tuva.

Compared with other Russian cities, the induction is going relatively well in Khabarovsk. Maj Gen Leontiy Kuzmich,

Kray military commissar, told that to Col Valeriy Usoltsev, our correspondent. And he backed it up with facts. Almost half of the youth have already passed through the assembly sites and left for the forces. The remainder will arrive at the assembly sites within the next few days. This certainly does not mean, however, that there are no problems with the draft there. The region, which was previously known for its healthy young men, is now also rapidly falling back. Col Fedor Shitin, deputy kray military commissar, reported that 20 percent of the recruits are classified as unfit for the military service during medical certification. Workers with the military commissariats see the cause not in the deteriorated ecological situation and not in the fact that there are now more "points" under which a youth can be deemed unfit for the service. They also link it to the fact that today's school children engage less in sports, primarily because of the high cost of sessions in sections. At the present time more than 100 recruits are undergoing treatment at hospitals at the medical workers' insistence.

The plague of draft evasion has not spared the Far East, however. Around 100 of those youth subject to be drafted into the army this fall are on the run. Lt Col Ivan Plevako, Khabarovskiy Rayon (rural) military commissar, commented that the rural area is also suffering from the "dodging" sickness, something not seen in the past.

"Considerably more conscripts would fail to report to the induction sites if we just let things take their own course," Maj Gen Kuzmich acknowledged.

It turns out that each staff member of a military commissariat is assigned a group of conscripts and answers for their arrival at the assembly site. They are escorted to the assembly site by two policemen, employees of the military commissariat. Especially great use of this method of delivering conscripts to the assembly sites is made in Komsomolsk-on-Amur.

The 1992 fall draft is marked by a decline in the educational level of the future soldiers. While a few years ago an absolute majority of the youth entering the military had a secondary education, 40 percent of the draftees today have completed only eight or even seven grades. Another thing: The percentage of married men is rising significantly.

The draft situation is best in the western-most part of Russia. The plan for shipping out new replenishments to their service stations is being almost totally fulfilled there.

The oblast assembly site is located in the very center of Kaliningrad, a few dozen meters from the monument to the 1,200 Guardsmen who died in the storming of Königsberg in 1945. The city fathers made this decision apparently for a good reason. Entering their army life from this sacred place, at which the Eternal Flame burns day and night, the youth are aware from the first day of their service to whom they owe their lives and what they are being called upon to protect.

Kaliningraders are departing from this sacred place to serve in the army or navy right now. They will serve in Moscow or Leningrad oblasts or in the Baltic Fleet. All of the married

men and those with hardships at home will serve in units stationed in Kaliningrad Oblast.

Young people who attempt to evade the draft here are not exactly handled with kid gloves. Lt Col Vladimir Semerinskiy, department chief in the oblast military commissariat, told Capt 2nd Rank Valeriy Gromak, our correspondent, that a warning is issued immediately to those who fail to report to the induction center and to their parents. No one has rescinded that article in the criminal code. And they start preparing the necessary documents for submission to law-enforcement agencies. This "clears up" the minds of a great many.

A purely local problem has recently appeared in Kaliningrad, to be sure, one which could complicate the draft next spring. The nation's western-most oblast has established a special-purpose police force. By decision of the administrative head the building in which the assembly site has been housed until now has been turned over to the OMON [special-purpose police detachment]. Public order has to be maintained, of course, but the reception of the youth for military service is no less important. And where is it to be conducted next spring? The question is open for now.

**Incidentally:** The address presented by Army Gen P.S. Grachev, minister of defense of the Russian Federation, at the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, indicated that as of 30 November only 21.6 percent of the new replenishments had shipped out for military service. A total of 41,584 men (8.3 percent) failed to report to the induction commissions at the designated time.

The draft has produced the poorest results in the North Caucasus Military District (59.4 percent) and the Siberian Military District (65.8 percent). Closest to fulfilling the induction plan are the Far East Military District (84.4 percent), the Transbaykal Military District (88.1 percent) and Kaliningrad Oblast (96.8 percent).

## CIS: POLICY

### Discussion of Need for Military Chaplains

93UM0219A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI  
in Russian 25 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Gondusov: "Are Priests Needed in the Army?"]

[Text] Society's misfortunes did not bypass the Army. Confusion and uncertainty about tomorrow reign in the hearts of officers and men. The reason is clear: previous ideals have been debunked, faith in a "bright communist future" has crumbled, the great power—and now also Russia—turned out to be a house of cards, laws do not work, and it is frightening to execute some orders: what if the order itself is criminal? Moreover, the "image of the enemy," by which the need for constant combat readiness was explained in the Army for many decades, has been destroyed. In this situation some officers have turned their gaze to the Orthodox Church, which in their opinion can offer feasible help in educating soldiers and draftees and giving them access to true national values and values common to all mankind.

Why specifically the church? According to data of the Russian Ministry of Defense Main Directorate for Work With Personnel, 25 percent of servicemen are truly religious, 65 percent perform individual religious rites, and only 10 percent of the soldiers called themselves atheists.

"Before the Revolution essentially every military formation had its own priest," says Aleksiy II, Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus. "Today, alas, this is unrealistic—cadres of the priesthood are insufficient even in parishes. But this does not mean that the church denies soldiers spiritual help. I believe the time has come to think about a temporary system of pastoral service in the troops before a permanent institution of military chaplains is established. This system can consist of assigning a priest from a nearby parish to each military unit; he would visit the servicemen, let us say, once a month or more often for a pastoral talk and for performing the sacraments—confession, eucharist, baptism... The visit of the priest also would appear to be useful in extraordinary circumstances—the danger of a clash within a unit, conflict situations, a serviceman's attempted suicide." A similar point of view is held by Pitirim, Metropolitan of Volokolamsk and Yuryev. He is the one who gave the first lecture in the Armed Forces Academy of the Humanities when the latter introduced the course "Introduction to Orthodoxy" to the training program for future military pedagogues.

The "Military Personnel for Spiritual Revival of the Army" movement actively supports introduction of the institution of military clergy. Colonel Mikhail Kuznetsov, chairman of the movement's organizational committee, reasons as follows: "The need for reviving society's religiousness, photographs of soldiers who died in barracks after retreat, and the mournful eyes of mothers who lost their sons forced me, a regular military man and an Orthodox person, to engage in reviving entities of the military clergy."

Colonel Stanislav Kavun, deputy chief of the Russian Internal Security Forces Directorate for Work With Personnel, does not agree with him in everything. It was not by chance I turned specifically to him, for it was Internal Security Forces servicemen who experienced all the tragedy of the present state of society, be it regions of interethnic conflicts or the acuteness of the criminogenic situation.

"I am against us rushing from one extreme to the other," Stanislav Fedorovich is convinced. "I agree that many forms of work with people are obsolete. It is not easy for officers to make themselves heard by a soldier's soul. But to see the solution only in limiting oneself to involving the clergy would be incorrect. I know soldiers do have an interest in God, but I am sure that it may be nullified if we exploit it without special need. I believe that any military structure will be saved from corruption by the law, which regulates the rights and obligations of servicemen, the procedure of their mutual relations and so on down to the trifles. Then one will be able to speak of full-fledged educational work with people. The church could fully be of benefit as a component of this."

How can one not agree with this? For it is impossible to constantly solve problems at the expense of the human factor by industriously "exchanging" nerve cells of officers

and men for unfulfillable promises, exploiting only their enthusiasm and belief, even if it is in God. A regimental priest hardly will act as an arbitrator in the conflict of a superior and subordinate or dispute the fairness in distribution of housing or other whim of the powers that be. What will remain for him? Only to call for patience? Yes, much in the Army needs spiritual doctoring, but even the Word of God will not help if roots of ailments are not destroyed.

But if the priest becomes a state employee, he is obligated to follow state policy in the Army. Where then is the guarantee that the secret of a soldier's confession will not become known to the commander in an hour or so? For, longing for a master key to the souls of its subjects, the present state is actively relying on rapprochement with Church figures, and so the holy fathers will be faced with a choice of whom to serve: God or the commander? This very thing is what Aleksiy II, Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus, is afraid of:

"If spiritual help turns into imposition of particular convictions by force, let alone by the commander's order, this will lead only to even greater absence of religiousness."

So there is hardly a need to be in a hurry to establish religious structures in the Army. But more serious training of present educators in religious cult questions would not hurt. There are many examples of close interworking of the command with the clergy. Officers do not refuse to let subordinates perform particular religious rites, but only at the desire of the soldiers themselves, without any coercion. Thus, for the last few years connected with events in "hot spots," it is in the Church that funeral services are performed for those who died performing military duty in the Internal Security Forces. The command element often takes part in such ceremonies.

The clergy takes part in measures connected with taking of the military oath, discharge of soldiers into the reserve, state holidays, and anniversaries of military units.

Ministers of religion have begun to speak out actively in the pages of military publications. The newspaper *SYN OTECHESTVA*, published in Yekaterinburg, even started up a special rubric "First Page Sermon." The publication has a permanent author, local Archpriest Ioann Osipovich. Here are the words with which he begins his sermon "On Discipline": "Desertion, fraternization with the enemy, disobeying superiors and their orders, disrespect, failure to execute and unpunctuality in service, willfulness and arbitrariness—you cannot read off all the manifestations indicating the decline and absence of military discipline in the Russian Army." And with appropriate references to religious sources he proposes: "All life discipline instilled by the Word of God demands that we Christians keep ourselves in holiness and honor, not in passion and lust, . . . not treat a neighbor illegally or with self-interest, because God is the avenger of all this." I know from colleagues that the newspaper sermons are in demand in subunits, but they try not to abuse them, believing that even a successfully discovered form of working with people will fade from moderation not being observed. It would appear that this goes fully for the topic of our discussion.

### Training Concept to Be Submitted to Military Collegium

93UM0214A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
4 Dec 92 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Ivan Sergeyev under the rubric "Topical Comments": "If We Want to Develop Real Soldiers, We Must Overcome the Spiritual Vacuum"]

[Text] We foresaw, of course, that the creation of a Russian army would entail many difficulties. The fact that it would essentially have to be built on the wreckage of the armed forces of the USSR following their split-up among the former republics, including the wreckage of former ideological dogmas and political postulates, promised a great deal of strife of all kinds. And it was not difficult to guess that the problem of indoctrinating the personnel would be one of the acute problems the developing army would encounter.

The Working Group for Development of a Concept for Indoctrinating Personnel of the Russian Federation's Armed Forces under the Ministry of Defense recently met in the Main Directorate for Personnel. This was the second session within a short time. And this pace of the work is perfectly understandable. The experience of history has taught us (if we have not totally lost the ability to assimilate the lessons of history) that at times such as our present period of transition it is particularly necessary to make a vigorous effort to stabilize the spiritual world of the man in uniform and to plant wholesome reference points in his mind. This is doubly important in the situation of declining prestige for the military service. In some formations, according to the Main Directorate for Personnel, up to 80 percent of the enlisted men say that they serve without enthusiasm, and 50 percent feel that the service is simply a waste of time. Soldiers do not demonstrate any fervent desire to take up arms even now, when recruitment for service under contract has been initiated.

Why the once sacred duty to serve the homeland has become "simply a waste of time" for some people is generally clear. A great deal has been done in recent years to undermine the very underpinnings of the military service, to plant confusion in the minds of the soldiers. It is easiest to destroy, as we know. It is considerably more difficult to build a vigorous new system of indoctrinal work.

After the political training was abolished, the armed forces found themselves without a strong base for the ideological development of the personnel, which it would have provided in combination with other forms of indoctrination: political briefings, meetings, the honoring of outstanding personnel, socialist competitions and so forth. One does not regret the loss of these things per se. But what then? What has taken their place? Their place was taken by social-humanitarian training, which was introduced by an order from the minister of defense of the USSR himself back in December of last year.

How is the new subject developing in the Russian army, and what is its role in the indoctrinal process? According to the military sociologists, around 40 percent of enlisted men surveyed are unaware that there is such a discipline in the

army. And mid-level commanders (from the battalion commander on up) approach it fairly cautiously, as though it were the "legal heir" to the political training, with all of the latter's blemishes. The following factor is also involved. While grades are given for other subjects, the humanitarian training requires only a fairly vague "pass or fail" and is not a part of the final exam.

You will recall that we previously had the title "excellent-rated in the combat and political training." It seems that it is not at all necessary to be excellent-rated in the social-humanitarian training, however. Not necessary for the soldier to know his roots, his origins, to believe that the homeland is sacred, that it is valor to serve the homeland, to grasp those moral and ethical basics which make a person a citizen. Or has the army ceased to be a school of patriotism and spiritual maturation? Are we truly unconcerned with where that individual with the excellent rating in real combat training will be aiming his fire, on whose side he will fight?

To go on, we all recall how rigidly the political classes were monitored. When personnel were taken out of class to perform some kind of chores around the facility, it was only with the personal consent of the chief of the political section or the deputy commander for political affairs. And the subject being covered had to be studied during hours outside the classroom. The number of hours allocated for social-humanitarian training today is conditional... upon the level of training of the personnel, the specific nature of the service duties, the deployment area and so forth. Since we know what service conditions are like today, however, one can imagine how these hours are spent by the platoon or company commander suffering in potato fields or in the performance of some other housekeeping chores. Furthermore, we have practically no training aids or methods literature, with the exception of individual articles published in certain military magazines. Such aids and literature are only beginning to be published in accordance with a recent order issued by the minister of defense, "On the Organization of Indoctrination of the Personnel in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation." And so, one can fully understand that soldier who does not even comprehend that he has attended classes in humanitarianism.

Now, consider this fact. A total of 18 colonels were formerly in charge of political training alone in the GlavPUR [Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy], whereas for an entire year the humanitarian training has been no one's responsibility. Only recently was a four-man group finally set up in the Main Directorate for Personnel to handle problems of the humanitarian training in the army and navy. In connection with this it would be appropriate to mention the fact that a 25-man council for ideological and military indoctrination is regularly elected each year in the Ministry of Defense of the FRG, whose membership includes prestigious and well-qualified people from the nation's public groups: the head of a university department, an accredited sociologist, a businessman, church representatives and so forth. That army believes that "political education in the Bundeswehr is the field of direct ideological influence upon the military personnel." (Quote from the

article "Political Education in the Bundeswehr" published in the magazine TRUPPENPRAXIS). It proceeds from the premise that "in certain groups of the population, particularly among the youth, there has occurred a decline of awareness of the political system, loss of moral orientation and political apathy." There you have it. If they have had a "decline of awareness" and a "loss of moral orientation," then what can be said of our country and our youth?

But let us get back to the problems of our army, in the recently approved, temporary regulations of which there is not even a mention of anything like this. One can only hope that the concept presently being worked out for indoctrinating the personnel will to some extent fill this vacuum. Life itself has dictated the need for such a concept. The factors include the difficult socioeconomic and political situation in the nation and the unpredictability of its further development, the ideological confusion in the minds of the people, including the servicemen, the national reprisals and conflicts in the society, the unrestrained defamation of the history of the nation and the armed forces and of the patriotic traditions, the lack of a complete set of laws governing the rights and obligations of the servicemen, the lack of social protection for them, use of the armed forces for other than their direct, designated purpose and a number of other circumstances. All of this, the concept states, is significantly undermining the moral factor in the army and necessitating urgent, serious political, economic, organizational, ideological and indoctrinal, moral and psychological measures to bolster the morale of army and navy military personnel.

The concept is presented in a large, 50-page document, which covers all aspects of indoctrinal work in the army and navy, from the concept's basic objectives and plan to the distribution of personnel and material-technical and financial support for the indoctrinal process.

The historical experience with military indoctrination in the Russian army occupies an important place in this document. For the first time it thereby includes in the foundation for the indoctrinal process in our army the military-pedagogical legacy of several centuries—from Peter I and G. Potemkin to M. Dragomirov and M. Skobelev. And there is something to learn in this experience and something to teach today's soldier, since the entire system of training and indoctrination of the Russian soldier was throughout the centuries imbued with the concept of loyalty to the homeland and the existing system.

I find it of interest that the concept contains a fundamentally new (for us, at any rate) approach for determining the moral and mental state of personnel in the units and subunits. While morale in the unit was formerly defined exclusively by the state of military discipline in the unit and the number of "binges," AWOLs and other extraordinary occurrences, it is now planned to define it with a five-point system, with the involvement of the military psychological-sociological staff and the use of carefully compiled questionnaires and surveys. Even the concept of "troop morale" will now be interpreted differently than in the past.

During the first half of December this year the Working Group for Development of the Concept for Indoctrination of Personnel in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation under the Ministry of Defense will present its work to the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense for consideration. One would like to hope that the approval of the concept and its rapid implementation in the forces will help to eliminate that spiritual vacuum which now reigns in many of our barracks.

#### Interview on CIS Working Groups, Military Coordination

93UM0237B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 8 Dec 92 p 2

[Interview with Ivan Korotchenya, coordinator for the CIS Working Group, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Valeriy Kovalev: "The Commonwealth Can Be Strengthened Only With Agreements"]

[Text] Minsk—Ivan Korotchenya, coordinator for the CIS Working Group, believes that the Commonwealth can be strengthened only with agreements.

From the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA file: Ivan Mikhaylovich Korotchenya was born in 1948 in Minsk Oblast, Belarus. He completed an agricultural institute in 1967 and then served in the Soviet Army, after which he entered the Belarusian Agricultural Institute. He has served as chief agronomist and chairman of a kolkhoz, chairman of a RAPO [rayon agro-industrial association] and chairman of the Vileyskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies. From March 1990 to April 1992 he served as a member of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus and chairman of the Permanent Commission on Glasnost, the Mass Media and Human Rights.

In January 1992 he was confirmed as coordinator of the Working Group of the Council of Heads of State of CIS Governments.

[Kovalev] The Commonwealth has been in existence for a year now. Ivan Mikhaylovich, could you tell us what the CIS coordinating agencies located in Minsk do?

[Korotchenya] It became apparent soon after the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States that a permanent coordinating body was needed to organize the preparation of documents for consideration at meetings in the councils of heads of state and government. And such an agency was established in January 1992. Its official name is the Working Group of the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government of CIS.

The group consists of permanent representatives (two from each CIS state) and three separate departments, each with five-six councillors.

I would like to underscore at the outset that the working group has no management or administrative functions. Its main job is the preliminary preparation of agendas for meetings and the thorough preparation, coordination and legal refinement of documents to be submitted for consideration and ratification by the leaders of the CIS nations.

[Kovalev] Are there any military specialists in your group?

[Korotchenya] Maj Gen Vasiliy Volkov is a permanent member of the working group as representative of the Main Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. He participates in the preparation of documents on military matters and attends meetings of experts, sessions of the Commonwealth's Council of Defense Ministers and meetings of heads of state and government.

Incidentally, it was with his help that we were able to coordinate efficiently and operationally the document prepared by experts on the Commonwealth's peacekeeping forces.

I would like to point out that the working group has established good working relations with the Glavkomat [Main Commissariat] of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. Documents coming to us from the department of Yevgeniy Ivanovich Shaposhnikov are practically always executed at the highest level, so to speak.

[Kovalev] The working group has been in existence almost a year. How would you evaluate its performance during this period?

[Korotchenya] The evaluation of our work is contained in the documents which have been approved and adopted by the councils of CIS heads of state and government. More than 200 have been signed during this period. On various issues: political, economic, financial, military (more than a hundred of the latter, incidentally).

The fact that the documents adopted do not always "work" is another matter. Unfortunately, a reliable legal mechanism has not yet been worked out for implementing decisions, and they are still left hanging in the air, as it were. This is not the fault of our members, however.

[Kovalev] Then you too, Ivan Mikhaylovich, are troubled by the absence of a solid legal foundation beneath the Commonwealth edifice? But perhaps things will start moving after the CIS Charter has been ratified?

[Korotchenya] Yes, the document has been prepared. It has been decided in advance to include it on the agenda of the forthcoming meeting in Minsk. As always, however, the final word is up to those who will discuss the draft.

[Kovalev] Could you tell us what will be in the draft CIS Charter?

[Korotchenya] The main CIS objectives and principles are practically the same as those originally defined in the Belavezhsk Agreement of 8 December and subsequently further developed and refined in the Alma-Ata Declaration and other documents. In my opinion, they have been put into something of a perfected, concentrated form in the draft charter.

The draft contains practically no arbitrary—dictated, so to speak—points. Take the makeup of the overall legal area, for example. The document does not impose its existence upon the CIS members. It states only that this is desirable. Each Commonwealth state retains full authority, strictured in no way, to define specific legal policy.

The charter as it now reads is actually oriented toward the achievement of two main objectives. On the one hand, it is to provide a more solid legal foundation for cooperation among the CIS countries. The second objective—which dominates at the present stage—is to preserve complete sovereignty for all the Commonwealth participants.

[Kovalev] Does the draft call for the establishment of any executive structures within CIS?

[Korotchenya] The draft contains a section titled "Commonwealth Agencies." It was born, quite frankly, out of the most acute disputation and debate. As a result, the experts included in this section, in addition to the existing councils of state and government, an interparliamentary assembly, a human rights commission, a consultative economic working commission, a council of ministers and other structures.

[Kovalev] The CIS has faced imminent disintegration more than once. Nonetheless, it continues to exist and is even noting its first anniversary. What do you see for its future?

[Korotchenya] I am by nature an optimist, and I therefore believe in the viability of the concept born in the Belovezhsk woods a year ago. In my opinion, the centrifugal forces in the Commonwealth have recently been reduced markedly, and the desire of the republics to be together and interact more closely, particularly in the area of economics, is growing considerably stronger.

[Kovalev] But according to reports in the press several republics are expressing doubt that the CIS Charter can be ratified in Minsk in its present form.

[Korotchenya] That could happen, of course. In any case, this matter will remain the important item on the agenda for the immediate future, because the fate of CIS depends upon it.

## CIS: STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

### Hindrances in Strategic Missile Forces

#### Electronic, Other Items in Short Supply

934P0031A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian  
12 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by Lt Col Sergey Nagoryanskiy, NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent: "A Sword in the Sheath Is Still a Sword"]

[Text] Man is the most dreadful thing on earth.

Think about this. The beast of prey takes only as much as he needs. A pack of wolves will not kill more reindeer than it can eat. Man is willing to destroy (and has destroyed) such things for himself in the millions. And everything that surrounds him—life on the planet. He is capable of splitting the globe. Not in half, but into small pieces.

Has nature really created a gravedigger for itself in the person of Homo sapiens? Or is it still stronger and can, having grown angry, destroy it (us) in a worldwide flood? Noah will appear, build an ark, and history will go around a second circle. Maybe this will be the third or fourth?

Such thoughts came to me at a depth of many meters, where I found myself with missile launcher crew members. Diabolical thoughts. Perhaps because we were located not far from hell... But it is paradise compared to the hell that even one launcher can create.

At the launcher consoles are people. It is not for the sake of passion that I will say: We must bow to them for the fact that they are protecting us. The missile launcher crew members of the strategic forces.

#### Weapons with the Philosophy of Absurdity

To serve 36 years in the Missile Forces is not a field to cross. That is why the general's head is gray.

Others look at people with the stripes on their trousers merely as owners of black "Volgas" and two-story cottages. But here to talk with the person, look into his eyes, and finally understand...that same Lieutenant-General Valeriy Alekseyevich Mikhtyuk. To learn that he began serving back under Marshal Zhukov with his iron discipline. That together with ranks and positions, concerns and complexities increased in geometric progression. That the person who is responsible for millions of lives is paid less than the driver of the streetcar rumbling by outside his window.

"Nuclear weapons have their own philosophy," says Valeriy Alekseyevich [Mikhtyuk]. "Everything that man has thought up for warfare—spear, assault rifle, tank—he has used. The atomic bomb was created nearly 50 years ago. But not once has it been used in a combat situation. (Hiroshima and Nagasaki are a completely different case.) Here it turns out, on the one hand, the most destructive weapons in history are ready for a strike at any minute, and, on the other, everything is being done to see that this does not happen."

The people who serve in the Strategic Missile Forces are more deeply aware of the illogicalness of such a situation than others.

I am lucky: I am the first journalist in the more than 30-year history of this strategic formation to be in its command post. This is the electronic brain connected to many hundreds of installations by thousands of cable-capillaries and radio and space communications. There are two direct telephones here—to the President of Ukraine and the minister of defense. A redundant system or, put simply, insurance precludes nonfulfillment of the assigned mission.

The combat shift at the command post is Lieutenant F. Mansurov, Major K. Stadnik, and Senior Lieutenant V. Bychkov. A Tatar, a Ukrainian, and a Russian. People of different nationalities, but of one love—for the cause which they serve. Take note of the name: combat shift. It is not an alert shift, but a combat shift. This generally trivial detail underscores the nature of the duty. In point of fact, everything here operates in the combat mode. It simply cannot be any other way.

The chief of the command post, Colonel I. Stepanov, tells about things which, unfortunately, I cannot reveal to the reader: they are classified. To me, knowing equipment on the level of a fountain pen, all this seems incomprehensible.

The strength of the intellect and labor invested in the Missile Forces forces one to look at our people differently. We consider them (ourselves) uncultured and lagging decades behind Europe. But at the command post I began thinking differently. We, the hungry and poor, are richer than other in mind and capabilities. Yes, this is a paradox: poorer, but...richer.

Stepanov's older brother, Viktor Dmitrievich, serves here. He is also a colonel. They are the sons of a Russian and a Karelian. The older Stepanov brother has two children who were born in Ukraine. He has been honorably serving in Ukraine for many years now. But the tasks which Viktor Dmitrievich and his subordinates perform go far beyond the framework of our power and even the entire former Soviet Union.

They are on duty for 3-4 days at the command post (like in all the Missile Forces). I repeat, from the side this looks showy: huge illuminated displays, super-equipment, the telephone to the President... But the people, hidden from the sun in the thick, reinforced concrete shell, breathing pumped in air instead of the pine-fresh air, all perceive this differently.

The missile launch crew members are on duty an average of 100 days a year, sometimes more. They themselves joke: there is no system better in the world than the "3-4" system. Between the times they go on combat duty, they have equipment classes and take certification tests. And, of course, there is the work with people. All this comprises the yearly cycle that is polished by decades.

We go from the command post to a more businesslike place—to the "guardroom." Here, too, everything is not simple. Two soldiers (compulsory service personnel) are located here for several days under an electronic lock, the key to which, you yourself understand, you will not find on the road. All the vital systems are self-contained and redundant. They prepare the food here themselves. In the event of unforeseen circumstances, the guard shift is able to stand duty for quite a few days. It is supplied, beginning with a needle and ending with a large-caliber machinegun.

The guards are under constant monitoring. Even when you open the metal shutter, a signal panel activates in the command post. In short, everything has been thought out, including for athletics. A trainer has been set up here, and there are weights.

It is probably most difficult for the combat crew of the launcher to stand duty. They are the ones, as I said before, who are closer to hell. The responsibility weighs more heavily on them than the many meters of armor above their heads. These two people (as part of the entire combat crew) perform strategic missions. During the Great Patriotic War, such missions were assigned to fronts.

Lieutenant Colonel O. Nazarov is assistant to the regimental commander for working with personnel; Senior Lieutenant O. Melnikov is a launch section engineer. They have been here at the console for six hours. Nearby are the unit colors: this is the procedure in the Missile Forces. By the way, political workers were always part of the combat crews in

the Strategic Missile Forces. To put it bluntly, there are combat officers and not "storytellers" with a pointer at the geographical map. Last year, when the political workers were removed from the establishment following the well-known events, they still continued to stand combat duty.

What are the two Olegs thinking about during these minutes? To make it look good, one could say that they were thinking about their lofty purpose and the enormous responsibility. But what are they really thinking? They are thinking about the basics of life, which today are a luxury for them. That same apartment (we will talk about the housing problem separately).

I will venture to assume what an American officer standing duty at a launcher is thinking. Where to go with his wife and children on his days off—to the country villa or Disneyland. And in what kind of a car: a Ford or a recently purchased Chrysler. What he is not thinking about is how to store up potatoes for his family for the winter. But our brother has to...

So, what does he have for his most difficult labor?

#### Destitute Millionaires

If the former party apparatchiks labored under the same conditions as the missile launcher crew members, they would have created privileges for themselves on par with an oil-rich Arab prince. Here everything is indeed difficult, although not a single one of the 20 officers whom I met complained about the difficulties. Maybe it was partly because they are proud people. Moreover, they are people with a special mentality and high intelligence. Such people do not cry on someone's shoulder.

To talk about how much the missile launcher crew members receive means to cut to the quick. But, I must say: such a paltry wage for such an enormous responsibility... One can take comfort in the fact that they do not receive any more in other troops. But does this really make it easier? A comparison with civilians also does not favor the missile launcher crew members. I already spoke of the streetcar driver. There are people who come out with 3,000-4,000 rubles [R] a month. But they, using contemporary language, hang around and earn a kopeck or two on the side.

I was told that a warrant officer recently discharged from the unit set himself up in a commercial structure and is buying a home for R2 million. It is not hard to figure out that he has enough for other things, too. Today he suggests to his former co-workers to leave the service and come to work for him.

People hear about such cases and are depressed. They feel destitute. Another paradox: the missilemen who are entrusted with millions of rubles worth of equipment, billions at today's prices, exist in such poverty. (It would be bombastic to use the word "live" in this context.) In one of the stores in Vinnitsa, a double-bed costs R120,000. You will not earn enough for it in a year. The only thing left to do is throw your overcoat on the floor and sleep on it.

True, the missilemen do have some benefits. For every six days of combat duty, they get one day added to their leave. But with a stipulation: they cannot run it up to more than 15

in a year. That is, if you are on duty for 120 days (that comes to 20 days of added leave), you will receive only 15.

In addition, each missileman is paid a monetary bonus for each duty. It would seem to be good. But what actually turns out? For these 3-4 days, they deduct so-called share from the bonus. As a result, the total amount of the bonus is less than what is charged for food. The next paradox: the more you are on duty (read, the more they squeeze out of you), the less you earn. Here is a specific example. Major K. Stadnik, with whom we became acquainted at the strategic formation's command post, last time received R652 for duty, and they deducted R730 from it. For some the difference is even greater.

I should add that the wives of many officers and warrant officers are deprived of the opportunity to work. And there is nothing on which they can economize, except to bring hindrances to work. Or during the duty divide the ration in two and thus scrape up about 300 kopecks. You see, the missile launcher crew members are directed to eat at the flight norm—in view of their special workload. Even at the previous norms, the energy content of the daily ration was over 4,600 calories.

If only it were just the financial difficulties that weighed heavily on the missile launcher crew members. The housing problem is even a more serious burden.

"In our formation, the problem is especially critical for every other serviceman," says Major-General R. Karimov. "As far as the officers are concerned, 56 percent of those without apartments immediately stand combat duty."

Here I recalled Lieutenant Colonel O. Nazarov. When I showed an interest in where he was now living, Oleg Aleksandrovich answered: "Nowhere..." "How can that be?" "Really, can you call this housing?" explained the officer. "An acquaintance went on leave for a month and a half and left the keys." "Well," I continued the conversation, "where will you live then?" "So far I haven't picked out anything. Strictly speaking, there is nothing to choose from."

And this is for an experienced officer who has devoted so many years to the service and savored all the "delights" of garrison life, including on Kamchatka. (Oleg Aleksandrovich spent about four years there.)

Where do those without apartments live?

"The lucky ones who have rented a place to live under a contract," continued Rustam Bakiyevich [Karimov], "number less than 50. But then, those who get a place through private traders number nearly 250. About 200 are cooped up in dormitories and hotels. And they charge them more money there, too."

Lieutenant A. Bezkravny graduated from school this year. He did not expect conveniences, but he also did not plan on spending R4,000 a month for a dormitory. It is good that his co-workers have found Andrey [Bezkravny] a place that fits his wage. Even then it is expensive, especially if you consider that the prices at the officers' mess are exorbitant.

Here are some typical facts in Colonel V. Stepanov's unit: Major S. Rybakov and his wife and two children are suffering in a one-room apartment; Captain V. Korolyuk and his family and many, many others are in the same conditions.

But housing is still being built. This year there are plans to turn over a 120-apartment building. Another building—with 100 apartments—is to be turned over early next year, and two 72-apartment buildings are to be turned over in the fall. This alone will not solve the housing problem. But, it will lessen its acuteness.

The problem is made more complicated by the fact that some of the officers leaving to serve in other countries of the Commonwealth are making all sorts of exchanges. For example, an officer who left the missile formation traded places with a civilian in Russia. The person who will arrive to fill the vacant position has no roof over his head. Thus, the line of people without apartments is increasing. True, the commander of the Carpathian Military District last fall banned the exchange (and also the privatization and granting of apartments) without consent of the district quarters and utilities directorate. But will this save the situation?

Problems of a personal nature are piling up on duty problems. Read about them in one of the coming issues.

#### **Operational, Social Lacks in Nuclear Forces**

*934P0031B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian  
13 Nov 92 p 2*

[Article by Lt Col Sergey Nagoryanskiy, NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent: "A Sword in the Sheath Is Still a Sword"]

[Text] (Conclusion. See 12 November issue for beginning.)

"We exchange sugar for units for the launcher computers," the missilemen might as well make such announcements in the Russian and Belarusian newspapers. It is in these countries that the main equipment suppliers and repair enterprises are located. And some of our Ukrainian plants are not pampering us very much.

"Neither Russia nor Ukraine has supplied us with anything since the beginning of the year," says Colonel N. Tavrov. "There are a particularly large number of delivery deficiencies from Russia."

Let us note that these involve not only electronics but also goods that are top-priority. For example, paints and lubricants. "For certain positions," Nikolay Ilich [Tavrov] continues, "there have been no deliveries for about two years."

In normal conditions, this is somehow tolerable. But not now, when serious inspection and maintenance work has begun. This kind of work is done once in three years. Today it is being dragged out over a period of time. It is not just due to delivery deficiencies, but also because organizational issues have not been resolved. Back in April, the formation was sent an inspection and maintenance schedule for 1993 from Moscow. Later a similar one came from the Ministry

of Defense of Ukraine. It specified that two units were to conduct inspection and maintenance, and two were to be removed from combat duty.

"We appealed to higher levels," Colonel N. Tavrov shares the sore subject. "We found mutual understanding. There has been some movement on deliveries of equipment and materials. But this is not enough. I will emphasize: in the Missile Forces the job must be done flawlessly."

What is preventing this?

Above all, it is the lack of an effective legal base among the powers of the CIS for mutual deliveries. They tried to establish one back at the beginning of the year. They prepared the appropriate agreement. I will give you the complete title—"On Principles of Supplying the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth Member-States with Arment, Equipment, and Supplies and Organizing Production Activities of Repair Enterprises and Scientific Research and Experimental Design Work." The agreement was considered at the February summit meeting in Minsk. However, in contrast to Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, the leaders of three other powers, including Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin, did not sign the document.

An agreement on strategic forces also came about at Minsk. This time they signed for Russia. Finally, they came to an agreement in the summer at Dagomys. Much remains only on paper, but you cannot use it to patch up holes or feed people. And it will not make the car move, it needs gasoline.

"In September-October we did not receive a single liter of gasoline," Lieutenant Colonel G. Pleshko says. "We have many dozens of vehicles that have to make trips daily."

Grigoriy Ivanovich [Pleshko] is also bothered by other concerns. There are refrigerators and electric heaters in the launcher "guardrooms" whose operating life expire back under Brezhnev... Who will replace them? When? Especially at today's crazy prices. For guard detail personnel—considering all the complexities of standing duty—a special ration was devised long ago. Today we are running out of the stocks of this special ration in the formation. There is also much concern about clothing and related gear.

"At one time we received rations from Russia," says Grigoriy Ivanovich [Pleshko]. "Today the deliveries have stopped. Our only hope is Ukraine."

With regard to storing up vegetables and potatoes for winter, here the missilemen are thoroughly stocked up.

Their problems are the same as ours, with the same gasoline and clothing and related gear. But we may also suffer badly and renounce something. It should not be like this in the Strategic Missile Forces. Their problems with fuel and lubricants and other difficulties—due to the exceptionally critical duty—are increased by a factor of two or three. That is why the missilemen should enjoy priority, and at the state level.

Many have said to me that in previous years, when there was a special need, aircraft were rushed to the manufacturer almost for nuts. Those were the rules. Firm rules. But now...

Of course, you can complain about the time costs, but this should not at all be an excuse for the situation that has developed.

Another sore spot is the manning of missile units with personnel. As far as officers, warrant officers, and junior specialists are concerned, much has been thought out. Things are far more complicated with compulsory-service personnel.

"In the fall of last year and the spring of this year, we ended up with less than the best trained young people," says Major-General R. Karimov, "even though we sent officers ahead of time to the military commissariats to select the most suitable draftees. But when we came directly for them, many of whom we had taken were not there... I understand that there are special selection requirements for the Border Troops, the National Guard, and the Black Sea Fleet, but not to the detriment of the Missile Forces, which by the way guard and protect not only the people of Ukraine but also those border guards, guardsmen, and the entire Army and Navy..."

These are the facts. Just according to the results of the latest draft, the number of young men not suitable for service in the Strategic Missile Forces went over half of the total number of young replacements. We very soon had to discharge or send some of them to the military commissariats. And the lads from unfortunate families were brought to militia offices. You see, most of the soldiers and sergeants stand combat duty at installations of special state importance!

"Here the parents also 'help,'" complains Rustam Bakiyevich [Karimov]. "Some arrive and simply take their sons away with them, like from a kindergarten. And all these lads are citizens of Ukraine. Here you cannot justify the actions by previous references to the fact that they are serving in an 'imperial' army."

Whom do the Strategic Missile Forces serve?

#### Servants of Two Gods

This, of course, should not be. One must serve only one master. And the missilemen are well aware of this. But circumstances (the breakup of the Soviet Union and the unified armed forces and the appearance of the independent states) took shape in such a way that you cannot solve the problems of subordination at one time, especially since they are more political than military.

When I visited the office of Colonel A. Selyunin, he had about 10 telegrams on his desk: from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and its Socio-psychological Directorate, from the Carpathian Military District, from Marshal Ye. Shaposhnikov, from Army General P. Grachev, from another Moscow commander... Often the directives being given mutually preclude one another.

"The missilemen are steadfast people," says Anatoliy Semenovich [Selyunin]. "But even they have a limit, including for patience. Moreover, it must not be tested in people who have spent their entire service in the combat mode. And it is also impermissible to demand that they

take the oath and do so as quickly as possible. Most of the people have determined their own position, unlike the politicians..."

"In the spring, all sorts of public organizations attacked us," says Colonel V. Stepanov. "They almost as an ultimatum demanded that we pledge allegiance to the people of Ukraine. But we are military people and obey orders. And so far there has not been any order to take an oath... True, the presidents of Ukraine and Russia agreed at Dagomys that the servicemen of the two powers called upon to serve in the Joint Armed Forces will pledge allegiance to the state of which they are citizens. But, first of all, the time periods have not been specified by this agreement. Second, what does it mean to divide people in conditions of the Strategic Missile Forces today?"

According to the results of a sociological survey, more than 50 percent of the officers are willing to pledge allegiance to the people of Ukraine, 15 percent wish to be transferred to Russia, and the rest are still thinking. If, as they argue here, there are even 5 percent who wish to be sent to Russia, this would have a devastating effect on combat readiness. The missilemen have no extra people. There are simply no people to put on combat duty in place of those leaving. If we resort to such a decision, the workload on those left will increase markedly. This is intolerable in conditions of the Strategic Missile Forces.

"We have been waiting a long time for a clear political decision on the strategic forces," says Lieutenant-General V. Mikhtyuk, commander of the large strategic formation. "And the issue of the oath is one of the main ones. But it must not be dramatized. Moreover, they should not demand some kind of percentage from us. Rephrasing a well-known expression, you cannot measure politics with arithmetic. At the same time, and this is the main thing, the missilemen are handling their missions. I will emphasize that they are combat missions. And the training process as a whole is proceeding normally. For example, the formation of Major-General R. Karimov was rated 'good' according to the results of an inspection. Given all the difficulties, we continue to guard reliably that which has been entrusted to us. And as commander, I am grateful to my subordinates for this."

There is another circumstance that is weighing on people. This is their future. In Lisbon, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk signed a treaty according to which our country will become nuclearfree by the end of 1997. This generally suits those officers who have completed 20 years of service. They will receive a full pension. But what about the young lieutenants who do not see any light at the end of the tunnel? We still must give the new people their due: the vast majority of them are serving conscientiously.

From time to time, politicians' "surprises" also tug at the missilemen. In the deputy halls and in the offices with artistic parquet, ideas sometimes emerge which absolutely do not take realities into account. It is simply hard to believe some of the statements. Suffice it to recall the much talked about statement by President Boris Yeltsin that all strategic missiles in the former Soviet Union had been retargeted...

Then there is the recent example where the minister of defense of the Russian Federation, Army General P. Grachev, stated that today the missiles located on the territory of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have been removed from combat duty and withdrawn into the reserve...

Imagine the reaction to such a statement by the people standing combat duty. Is it permissible to play hide-and-seek with them?

Sometimes the "experts" throw up ideas which look attractive to the simpletons and help an author gain a trump card for the next political game. Not too long ago, the idea was expressed that Ukraine is capable of putting satellites into space using the missiles located on its territory. When I asked the missilemen about this, they looked at me as if I was not all there...

That is politics. Life itself is weighing on the missilemen. Although many of them are sitting under ground, they see more and largely understand better than you and I. When they stand combat duty, people are not only working. Some are holding hunger strikes in the center of the capital, others are building "forosy" [transliterated], others are speculating in women's underwear in Poland, and still others are selling state secrets. And others...

The recent discussion of the military doctrine in the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine has prompted the missilemen to start thinking. The polarity of the opinions and proposals expressed, as it appeared to me from conversations with officers, alarmed them somewhat. Why? Because, in their opinion, not all deputies have a clear enough understanding of what is meant by "nuclearfree status" and "neutral power," and not all of them fully understand what nuclear weapons are and how they can be used. Such a lack of understanding has come about partly because the people's deputies, with rare exception, have never visited the missile launcher crew men. But, the military men themselves back last year were knocking on the doors of parliament. And not without some success. When the Supreme Soviet was discussing the draft Law on Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Family Members, Major-General Yu. Yushchenko, Colonel V. Karaslay, and Lieutenant Colonel V. Aleshchenko traveled from the large strategic formation of the Strategic Missile Forces to Kiev. They tried to persuade deputies and argued. As a result, a significant aspect was added to Article 3 of the law—on the status of servicemen of the Strategic Deterrence Forces.

Now about mutual understanding. I will dare to make a proposal. Shouldn't the deputies, members of the government, and other interested structures meet with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the missilemen? Perhaps it is a joint discussion of the entire spectrum of strategic problems that would make it possible to crystallize the state's military doctrine. As we know, the finishing touches are being put on it. For its part, NARODNA ARMIYA could organize such a discussion.

**Can a Nuclear Warhead Be Stolen?**

Either this question or another tormented two lads, and they decided to try to get to a launcher. First of all, the system of barriers would not let them in. Second, the guard detail personnel. But the lads did not know about this and went, as they say, to the point.

I am not describing in detail. I will say only that the actions of the guards prevented the people from dying. You see, a high-voltage current runs through one of the obstacles. One almost touched it, and... That is when Junior Sergeant O. Zherebnyy and Privates V. Kazartsev and V. Garenko distinguished themselves.

Similar situations have occurred more than once this year. They all, so to speak, are minor in nature. But they force us to begin thinking again about nuclear safety.

This issue is of special importance for the missilemen (and for the whole world, for that matter). Now it is possible to accomplish much that is not so complicated: it took years to work out mechanisms of servicing, preventive maintenance, scheduled routine work, and the like. What will we have to do in the future? Take the missiles out of the silos, dismantle them, and transport the nuclear warheads and containers with highly toxic fuel to the appropriate points. In short, the risk of an unsanctioned actions, as the missilemen say, increases under such circumstances.

There is experience in such dismantling in the former Soviet Union. But even taking it into account, the complexity of all the work will not decrease. We must train people for this, and do so not on a state basis and not merely a military basis. We must do so in order to eliminate those difficulties which have been covered in a small part in these two articles.

We should put some of the apologies for politicians on a missile and launch them somewhere far away! But if we could, we could get rid of countless problems along with them. Another problem is the transfer of military installations of the missile units being reduced. In the small town of Lipniki and at Zhitomirshchina, such an installation was transferred long ago to local authorities. Today it looks like a place following a nuclear strike. It was ransacked... Will the same thing happen with the rest of the property being vacated and valued by a recent commission of the Ministry of Defense at more than R1 billion? It is criminal to waste this given our poverty.

But not everything is so gloomy and hopeless, even in housing. The command authorities of the large strategic formation, with the help of "Ukrinvestkonversiya" [Ukrainian Conversion Investment], which allocated R42,557,000 to the missilemen, have resolved the issue of building several dozen apartments. We can make other breakthroughs, but they do not give bureaucratic shackles...

Missiles in parades have always caused us pride. They are menacing weapons. Even outside of war they are menacing: a sword in the sheath is still a sword. After visiting units of the Strategic Missile Forces, one is filled with even more pride for these people. They are people of a backbreaking heroic profession.

**There is someone we can count on...**

**Mobile Missile Safety Factors Asserted**

*93UM0242C Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY  
in Russian No 48, Dec 92 p 4*

[Interview with Professor V. Chobanyan, doctor of technical sciences; Professor Ye. Sushkevich, candidate of technical sciences; and Professor V. Blinov, doctor of technical sciences; by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given; published under the rubric "Specialists Comment": "The PS-22 Remains Functional"]

[Text] In ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No. 15 for 1992 a short piece was published under the title "Missiles Leave a Trail of Dust" with reference to the expert P. Belov. Today viewpoints are presented by a specialist for operation of missile arms, Professor V. Chobanyan, doctor of technical sciences; a specialist in the operation of nuclear weapons, Professor Ye. Sushkevich, candidate of technical sciences; and a leading specialist in explosive safety, Professor V. Blinov, doctor of technical sciences.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Recall that our piece discussed the idea that the PS-22 and PS-12M mobile missiles presented a greater danger to the population itself than to a possible enemy.

[Chobanyan] As for the danger these missiles present to the enemy, one can give this example. Upon the elimination of medium-range mobile missiles (SS-20) by the launching method, 71 of the 72 missiles hit their mark accurately.

Is there a problem with providing for security of mobile missile systems? Undoubtedly there is. Any weapon is dangerous.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] People give the probability of an accident involving a nuclear warhead with a discharge of radioactive substances as 0.01-0.1.

[Sushkevich] The absurdity of these figures is confirmed by the fact that if one were to follow this "calculation," during the last two months, for example, in the Armed Forces there should have been from 50 to 500 accidents with warheads, which is comparable to 50-500 Chernobyls.

If one is to speak about the relative evaluation of the consequences of a nuclear explosion (the more so an accident with a nuclear warhead with radioactive discharge) and the accident with a nuclear reactor at the nuclear power plant, the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster were incomparably graver. In particular, the decline of activity with a nuclear power plant accident is considerably slower than with a nuclear explosion. Thus, for example, the active contamination of the locality with a nuclear explosion decreases 3,000-fold during the first hour, and with accidents at nuclear power plants—2.5-fold. Within 10 days it is a million-fold as against eightfold.

[Blinov] In all stages of the life cycle of a missile system there are theoretical studies and experimental tests of individual components, combinations of them, mockups, and experimental models, and rehearsals in keeping with fairly strict requirements. In tests a missile is dropped on rocky

ground from an altitude of one kilometer, washed with combustible materials and ignited, and shot out of various kinds of weapons.

The requirements for explosion safety for domestic missiles (particularly missile fuels) are stricter than for analogous foreign models. Convincing evidence of this is the accident-free operation of the SS-20 missile system under severe conditions over more than 15 years.

#### **Underground Relocation Facilities Noted**

*93UM0242B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 48, Dec 92 p 8*

[Reader's letter and response]

[Text] *There are rumors that there are underground passageways near our Yekaterinburg. If this is true, when and for what purpose were they constructed?*

[Signed] Ye. Volskiy, Sverdlovsk Oblast

According to the information we obtained from an associate of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, indeed, soon after the Great Patriotic War in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) an underground city was built in case there was a Third World War. To this end later, as we now know, a similar but more comfortable city was built to the southwest of Moscow. B. Yeltsin, when he was first secretary of the Sverdlovsk CPSU Oblast Committee, knew of the existence of the underground city and, they say, visited it many times. That is where the reserve Russian government headed by Lobov was to have begun its work if the members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency had been able to neutralize the White House leadership. In the words

of that same security associate, a similar but considerably smaller underground city was built at the beginning of the sixties on the shores of Baykal.

#### **CIS: GROUND TROOPS**

##### **Specifications of 'Vityaz' Articulated, Tracked Transport**

*93UM0215A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Dec 92 p 2*

[Article by Colonel Vitaliy Moroz: "Vityaz of the Northern Routes"]

[Text] While looking at the photo of the Vityaz, you might think that the vehicle had been involved in an accident: it looks as if the cab has been raised toward the sky. Actually, its driver-mechanic reared it in order to demonstrate a property that is inherent only to articulated, tracked transports. In this position, as if running its raised nose onto a ramp, it is easier, say, to get into the hold of an amphibious assault ship or to negotiate a small vertical wall. The articulated, tracked transport can also amaze you while negotiating a wide ditch. The coupling device between the transport and trailer is capable of holding the powered module suspended in midair, thus not permitting the transport to prematurely "nod".

On the whole, articulated, tracked transports have a striking off-road capability and maneuverability that is inaccessible to all other types of vehicles. Both the tractor and the trailer are active, that is, they are connected to the engine and have drive wheels. So, it's as if the second element [trailer] carries out the role of a continuous and powerful pusher.

**Primary Technical Specifications of DT's [Articulated, Tracked Transports]**

	DT-10P	DT-30P	DT-30
Weight when fully-equipped, in tonnes	22.5	28.0	29.0
Cargo capacity (including crew), in tonnes	10	30	30
Number of seats in cab	5	5	5
Maximum length of transported cargo, in meters	6	6	13
Engine	Multifuel diesel with an output of 710 horsepower		
Maximum speed, in kilometers per hour			
—on land	36	36	36
—on water	5-6	4	—
Average pressure on ground, in KGS/cm <sup>2</sup>	0.22	0.3	0.3
Range based on fuel, in kilometers	500	500	500

The modules are connected by a quite complex turning-coupling device. It ensures, using technical language, that the elements rotate in any plane—horizontal, longitudinal-vertical, and transverse. This device's hydro-cylinders also permit rearing the vehicle.

The elements are also forced to fold while making a turn. If an ordinary single-element tracked transport, a prime mover, is compelled to brake one of the tracks to make a turn and in the process also loses not only power but also, as

a rule, buries itself in soft ground, the articulated, tracked transport avoids that danger. While turning, it only changes the angle between the modules and all four tracks operate in the same mode.

The low average area pressure on the ground facilitates the high off-road capability—it has wide (90-110 cm) snow and swamp caterpillar tracks and road wheels with toothed tires. Its as if the articulated, tracked transport feels right at home on swampy mud and on snowy virgin soil. A water barrier

also does not stop the DT-10P or the DT-30P: the vehicles have a hermetically-sealed hull and float well.

The family of "Vityaz" articulated, tracked transports (the DT-10P with a 10-tonne cargo capacity, the DT-30P and the non-amphibious DT-30 with a 30-tonne cargo capacity) that have been manufactured by Ishimbayskiy Transport Machine Building Plant since 1982 are designed for use in the severe road and climactic conditions of the North, Siberia, and the Far East. Besides everything else, the articulated vehicles permit us to have a more solicitous attitude toward the easily damaged nature of the North. With its impressive weight, the articulated, tracked transport leaves a shallower track in the tundra and in the permafrost zone than even lighter transport vehicles. Only it is capable of following the same road two or three times.

The articulated, tracked transport is simply irreplaceable during search and emergency rescue work that is associated with areas that are flooded, covered with snow drifts, avalanches, or widespread destruction.

Under army conditions, articulated, tracked transports serve to transport arms and equipment, and to deliver ammunition to positions. Individual vehicles are equipped to transport personnel and as command and control facilities.

The new type of tracked transport vehicle that has been developed by the defense industry is finding widespread application in the national economy. They are equipping Vityaz's with cranes, fuel tanks, earth-moving and fire-fighting equipment and they are being adapted to transport outsized cargoes...

It is not difficult to compare the articulated, tracked transport with its foreign counterparts. Only countries that are adjacent to the North—Sweden, Finland, Canada, and the United States—are involved with this type of vehicle. The Swedish Bv-202 and Bv-206 articulated, tracked transports are successful designs. But they are vehicles with a small cargo capacity with a 97 horsepower engine. The tractor has been selected as the base for powerful articulated, tracked transports in the United States and Canada. Hence, the inadequate speed—16-19 kilometers per hour. Only our articulated, tracked transport has an amphibious capability, although, as can be seen from this short article, it is unique in many other ways.

#### Specifications of 'Ulybka' Mobile RDF/Weather Monitoring System

93UM0236A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Dec 92 p 2

[Article by Col Genadiy Miranovich, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The 'Ulybka' Makes the Sight More Accurate"]

[Text] Having noticed my bewilderment over the not altogether traditional name for the just-declassified radio direction finding [RDF] and weather monitoring system, the associates of the Moscow Scientific Research Institute developing it, Colonel Valeriy Lobanov and Lieutenant Colonel Vadim Medvedev, with one voice objected: you cannot get by without precise weather data in combat, every

commander is glad to have the data, and that is why we came up with the name 'Ulybka' [Smile]...

Be that as it may, this system, produced by the Yekaterinburg Electronic Automatic Equipment Plant (chief designer—Yuriy Vladimirovich Neyman), has been faithfully serving the Army and Navy for three years already. Indeed, not a single exercise in which artillery or missile firings are conducted, an assault force is dropped, or aviation operates could get by without it. The point is that the 'Ulybka' provides commanders and staffs extremely important data on air temperature, density, and humidity at a certain altitude and wind velocity and direction. This is needed in order to make appropriate sight and guidance system adjustments. In addition, the 'Ulybka' warns sailors above an imminent gale and other changes in the weather, suggests the best time for a drop-zone delivery for assault landing forces, and so forth.

The system consists of two vehicles (equipment and generator) and a trailer with a supply of hydrogen in bottles. By the way, the set of the transportable supply of hydrogen and other expendable supplies enables the 'Ulybka' to provide weather information support to a division's combat operations for 5-7 days. But...let us talk about everything in sequence.

Have you heard anything about radiosondes? They are the most important element of the 'Ulybka'. Rising to an altitude of up to 30 km on a special balloon filled with hydrogen, already 15-20 minutes after launching the radiosonde can practically continuously furnish you with the weather parameters in which you are interested. The information received will be deciphered right there in the equipment vehicle, which is equipped with a radar/RDF, computer, and display, recording, and data processing systems, and be transmitted according to purpose.

#### Specifications of 'Ulybka' RDF/Weather Monitoring System

1. Sounding altitude	at least 30 km
2. Range of radiosonde tracking	at least 200 km
3. Deployment time	20 minutes
4. Packing up time	15 minutes
5. Time needed to receive first weather message up to an altitude of 30 km	90 minutes
6. Time needed to receive interim weather messages	at operator's request (in 15-20 minutes)
7. Speed of ascent of sonde	300 meters/minute
8. Crew size	5 people

Incidentally, its consumers are not only the military. The 'Ulybka' can also be used with the same success in civilian life, say, to receive the necessary data about the gale warning we already mentioned and in ecological monitoring of the environment.

Another thing about the unquestioned merit of the system as it applies to military affairs. Before, the task of weather support for the troops was accomplished by the ARMS-3

(vehicle-mounted radiotechnical meteorological station). One of the significant shortcomings of this station was the fact that it was easy to pinpoint the disposition of the combat elements of missile troops and artillery according to the station's radar emission. In addition, its sounding unit was somewhat dangerous in collision, say, with an aircraft. The 'Ulybka' has a direction finding method of determining the location of the sounding unit (the sounding unit "peeps," and the station is silent), which makes the system virtually invulnerable in terms of camouflage. And the sounding unit itself is made in such a way that it does not pose a hazard to aircraft.

### CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

**Kazakh Firing Range Unavailable to Air Defense**  
*93UM0213A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*4 Dec 92 p 2*

[Article by Aleksandr Ivanov: "How Much Is a Pound of Firing Range Trouble Today?"]

[Text] Financial support for the combat training of the PVO [Air Defense] Troops has been cut so extensively that, given the current increased cost of everything, many antiaircraft missile units are simply unable to go to the firing range to perform live-firing practice. There are also numerous difficulties with the ranges themselves.

Col Gen R. Akchurin, commander of the Antiaircraft Missile Troops, explained the situation this way:

"No final agreement has been reached with Kazakhstan on the use of our firing range there, and the firing practice is carried out mainly with simulators."

The general said that the antiaircraft missile units currently perform live-firing exercises only at the Navy's firing ranges in the North, the Far East and the Transbaykal. The circumstances there do not permit employment of the maximum number of targets or a broad spectrum of interference, however.

#### What is the solution?

The commander in chief of PVO Troops decided that the final round of the competitions for best specialists would be conducted not at the firing range, as specified by the orders covering this, but at the simulation training center of the Moscow PVO District.

The officers and generals should be given credit, especially those in the organization of the ZRV [Antiaircraft Missile Troops] commander, for the fact that they managed to organize the competitions with maximum effectiveness and to conduct them at a high level. The missilemen say that the units did not prepare as thoroughly this past year even for the final testing as they did for these competitions.

What were the results? All of the participating crews "shot down" 100 percent of the targets. They demonstrated fairly smooth functioning and a good knowledge of the equipment and the tactics of modern antiaircraft combat.

The competitions stimulated the personnel and made it possible seriously to prepare and to demonstrate on the

practical level what they had achieved in the training and to adopt the know-how of the best. And the best were the missilemen of the Moscow PVO District commanded by Lt Col A. Loginov. Incidentally, the crew was made up exclusively of officers.

At the present time the PVO Troops are the most defense-oriented of the five branches of armed forces, having no offensive weapons at all. And no matter what is said, they are primarily Russia's shield. It is therefore gratifying that despite all of our current difficulties, the troops are finding a way to engage in their main job, combat training.

### CIS: NAVAL FORCES

**Pasyakin Report on Evacuation of Poti Garrison**  
*93UM0178A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*18 Nov 92 p 3*

[Article by Vladimir Pasyakin, under the rubric: "From The Black Sea Fleet": "The Evacuation from Poti Has Resumed. Attacks Are Also Continuing Against the Evacuees"]

[Text] As we have already reported, the evacuation of Navy personnel and their family members from Poti has resumed under the terms that have been set forth by the Georgian side: at the civilian port and under strict control.

This is severely impeding the evacuation because servicemen and their families are being subjected to very severe pressure from various types of armed formations and bandits. Beatings and robberies at night have become common place.

Naval Warrant Officer Leonid Kovalchuk's family was recently subjected to an attack. Two unidentified individuals—one with a dagger and the other with a sawed-off rifle—burst into the warrant officer's apartment. Kovalchuk managed to disarm the former who was armed with a dagger. The other bandit fled.

Unfortunately, robberies and attacks against servicemen far from always result in such a happy ending. Yesterday, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reported that on 13 November at 9 o'clock, three unidentified individuals, (two of them with assault rifles), attacked Naval Warrant Officers Vladimir Berezyuk and Vasiliy Alekseyuk who were loading their personnel effects into a car near the entrance of an apartment building. The criminals were not stopped by the fact that the warrant officers were armed. The bandits opened fire with automatic weapons at close range. Both servicemen were severely wounded. The criminals seized Warrant Officer Berezyuk's assault rifle. Alekseyuk fired back with his pistol. Vladimir Berezyuk died on 15 November. Alekseyuk is in serious condition at Batumi Hospital with wounds to the head and legs.

We asked Novorossiysk Garrison where the evacuees from Poti are being sent. Captain 3rd Rank Gennadiy Gnezdev reported that an operational team is being formed right now to receive the evacuees. Poti Ship Brigade Chief of Staff Captain 2nd Rank Oleg Abrosimov is heading that team.

### Technical Profile of 'Kiev' Heavy Aircraft Carrying Cruisers

93UM0197A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
1 Dec 92 p 2

[Article by Vasiliy Fatigarov in the "Arsenal" column:  
"Rough Sailing for Aircraft Carrying Cruisers?"]

[Text] Bad news has been received from the Pacific Ocean Fleet: the aircraft carrying cruiser Minsk has been towed to a graveyard for warships. And she is only 15 years old. Incidentally, the rich USA is still maintaining on the active list modernized ships whose hulls were built back in the days of the Second World War.

There has come about a change in the situation, in that an enterprise that used to build aircraft carrying cruisers and was most convenient for ship repair and modernization is now located beyond Russia's borders. Also coming about is a change in attitude toward the Navy.

The idea of basing aircraft on the decks of ships is creditable to officers of the Russian Navy: Ships Engineer Corps Captain L. Matsiyevich and Corps Colonel M. Konokotin. However, the domestic lead in this area was lost. The American pilot Eugene Ely in 1911 was the first to fly his wheel-equipped airplane to land onto a ship, this being the cruiser Pennsylvania, the deck of which was fitted with a special wooden platform bordered by sandbags. In the Second World War, aircraft carriers constituted the main naval striking force of Japan, the USA, and Great Britain. Germany also possessed aircraft carriers during the time of that war. The unavailability of carrier-based aircraft in the Third Reich is the only plausible reason why the Graf Zeppelin failed to enter into any naval engagements. (Incidentally, after the war the German aircraft carrier was signed over to the USSR, only to slip into oblivion.)

It was not until 1962 and 1963 that the Soviet Navy laid the keels for two helicopter carriers: the ASW cruisers Moskva and the Leningrad. The year 1970 saw the start of construction of the aircraft carrying cruiser Kiev, which was capable of accommodating vertical take-off and landing aircraft (VTOL) as well as helicopters.

The role and place of this class of ships in the Navy became a subject of heated discussions, lasting many years, between influential forces in the higher echelons of the party and state, the Ministry of Defense, and the Naval High Command. These discussions in our days have broken through the closed doors to be taken up by the mass information media.

The Russian Navy as of today possesses five TAKRs [heavy aircraft carrying cruisers]. They were designed in the PKB [Design/construction Bureau] headed by Oleg Vladimirovich Antonov. The chief designers were Arkadiy Vasilyevich Marinich, Vasiliy Fedorovich Anikiev, and Lev Vasilyevich Belov. The ships were built in Nikolayev. Turned over to the Navy in 1975 was the Kiev; in 1978, the Minsk; in 1982, the Novorossiysk; in 1987, the Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov (with the laying of the keel for the Baku). These ships

were designed to accommodate Ka-25 helicopters and the VTOL Yak-38 (in the case of the Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov, the Ka-27 and the Yak-41M). The VTOL Yak-38 is being phased out. As far as the Yak-41M is concerned, work on this aircraft was slated for completion by the time the last TAKR was launched, but the aircraft never did see blue skies as a result of severe budget cutbacks. The Kiev, Minsk, and Novorossiysk are in need of medium maintenance and modernization. Plans called for initiating this work on the Minsk in Nikolayev in 1991. A standard approach was developed to modernize and perform medium maintenance of the Kiev class carriers. The plans for well-known reasons were not to be made a reality, with the result that the fate of Russia's largest ships may be sealed.

The first domestic ship designed to accommodate conventional take-off and landing aircraft (CTOL) was the TAKR Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov (at the time of laying of the keel for the Tbilisi), which entered Naval service in the end of 1990. Flight and state tests of the Su-27K and the MiG-29K carried out in 1990 and 1991 indicated that the aircraft offered high combat and operational characteristics and complete compatibility with the ships with respect to accommodation and employment. However, present conditions being what they are, there is pronounced danger that in the next few years the most modern ship will not be provided with her full complement of aircraft.

A tragic fate was suffered by the first nuclear-powered TAKR Ulyanovsk, the keel of which was laid in Nikolayev. Ukraine decided to cut up the unfinished ship for scrap. And the TAKR Varyag is still sitting on ways in Nikolayev awaiting her fate, which will hardly be the kind to evoke envy.

Will Russia be successful in at least retaining that which she has accomplished with great difficulty? To this question there is as yet no complete answer.

#### Tactical/technical Features of the Kiev Heavy Aircraft Carrying Cruiser

1. Displacement—41,000 t.  
(Gorshkov: 44,500 t.  
Kuznetsov: 55,000 t.)
2. Dimensions (in meters)  
Length—273 (approx.)  
Beam—50 (approx.)  
Draft—12 (approx.)
3. Speed, maximum—more than 32 knots (approx. 58 km/h)  
Speed, cruising—18 knots (approx.) (approx. 32 km/h)
4. Range at cruising speed—more than 13,500 miles (24,300 km +)
5. Endurance—30 days
6. Complement—1,300 men (approx.)
7. Power plant: boiler-turbine unit, four shafts, rating—200,000 horsepower (approx.)

## 8. Armament

- a) Aircraft: 36 aircraft: Yak-38s, Ka-25 and Ka-27 helicopters in any mix (Kuznetsov: 50 units: Su-27Ks, MiG-29Ks; can accommodate Yak-41M VTOL)
- b) Missiles and guns: two twin missile launchers; one twin missile launcher; four two-canister missile launchers; two two-tube 76-mm guns (Gorshkov: two single-tube 100-mm guns); eight six-barrel 30-mm guns.
- c) ASW and electronic equipment; communications gear for maintaining contact with force ships, rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, and shore command centers.

**Chinese Assist in Pacific Fleet Housing Construction**  
*93UM0237A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*8 Dec 92 p 2*

[Article by Capt 1st Rank Vladimir Shirokov and Maj Nikolay Romanov under the rubric "Under Control—the Housing Problem": "The Chinese Are Assisting the Fleet"]

[Text] Today the Pacific Fleet is acutely in need of apartments for more than 1,500 officers and warrant officers. At some garrisons on the Pacific coast there is a shortage of kindergartens, nurseries, officer housing.... The problems of building housing and social and cultural facilities are being resolved with difficulty, but the fleet has recently acquired some good assistants. They are from neighboring China.

In Vladivostok alone more than 170 Chinese construction workers are building three apartment buildings. They are also converting a barracks into an apartment building on the city's outskirts. There will be two-, three- and four-room apartments in the former barracks.

Construction workers from China's Dairen International Association for Technical and Economic Cooperation, the Huanan and Bohai companies, have contracts to build more than 600 apartments in Vladivostok, Sovetskaya Gavan, Khabarovsk and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka, two dormitories and two schools. One of the latter, in Sovetskaya Gavan, will have a capacity of 1,176 students; the other, on Kamchatka, 1,266.

What are the distinguishing merits of the Chinese builders?

"The contract was concluded on a barter basis," the chief of the construction directorate which works directly with the Chinese company, said. "The Chinese will receive scrap metal in the form of written-off ships, coniferous lumber and fish."

"We are pleased with the work performed by the Chinese. We are thinking of extending the contract with them next year," said Adm G. Khvatov, commander of the Pacific Fleet. Col Gen N. Chekov, Russia's chief of construction and billeting, who visited the construction sites, shares that opinion.

**CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES****Gen Churanov Interview on Switch to Territorial System**

*93UM0198A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*2 Dec 92 p 2*

[Interview of Gen Churanov by Pyotr Altunin: "The Rear Today and Tomorrow"]

[Text] Under conditions in which the Army and Navy are undergoing reform, the structure of the Rear of the Armed Forces of Russia is also changing. The transition to a territorial system of rear support of the troops will begin on 1 January, 1993. Our correspondent met with the chief of the Rear of the Armed Forces of the RF, Lt. Gen. Vladimir Churanov and asked him to tell us about these changes.

This work began back some three years ago, when the first signs of decentralization of the domestic economic started, says Vladimir Timofeyevich. How were supplies delivered in our country? You remember the joke. It was easy: first everything was hauled to Moscow, and then people came to the capital and bought what they needed . . .

That's how it was in the Army: there were centralized deliveries, they were distributed among the districts and fleets, which worked to supply armies, divisions, and regiments. Nobody was interested in the fact that it was a cumbersome system, that hundreds of military officials traveled up and down the country supporting the chain of supply, and that a mountain of paperwork was created.

Today the situation has changed. Of course the transition to the market is very hard and painful, and the Army, at the very center of change, feels it all. But we have to do something rather than bemoan our fate, so now we have set about creating a territorial system of troop supply. Its concept was approved by the Minister of Defense, and the lower levels have been briefed. Starting with the new year, its practical introduction will begin. As always, the rear organs of the Moscow Military District will lead the way.

[Altunin] Vladimir Timofeyevich, you said that in the Moscow MD (and I know also in other districts) this work has been going on for several years.

[Churanov] Yes, and it has brought positive results. However the experiment was conducted by services: by the fuel and food services, which have the most extensive net of warehouses and bases. But that was also its flaw, that it was confined to the framework of individual services. After all, the rear constitutes a complex of interrelated services.

The mission was this: to qualitatively improve supply of units and sub-units with all types of goods, to simplify the process of providing money, foodstuffs, clothing, medicines, and materials to them, and to raise the initiative and responsibility of the employees in the field. Warehouses and bases, which frankly are support bases for personnel, must become mobile supply elements rather than "supply storage facilities."

This approach to our work is dictated by the situation in the country, where decentralization increases with each day. Oblasts, rayons, plants, and collective farms are being granted rights to ever-increasing economic independence. Besides that, everything is still in the developmental stage . . . On this basis, units and tactical formations within the context of rear supply now must acquire greater rights, be in closer contact directly with the areas producing the material.

[Altunin] What will the new supply system be like in terms of organizations?

[Churanov] Within the borders of the military districts, depending on their size, two, three, or four territorial rear supply centers (TTTsO) will be created. Each of them will be assigned administrative command functions. Several warehouses, bases, and departments for the main types of supplies will be joined together.

[Altunin] But won't this require the establishment of their own sort of staffs for the "centers" and an increase in personnel?

[Churanov] This has been ruled out. There are a lot of free buildings on the bases and in the tactical formations now. And in fact the staff will be small: each office will be responsible for a specific area of supply.

I want to stress once again that this whole operation of reforming the structure of the rear can be handled by the present complement of personnel.

But overall, independence and command authority will be expressed in the fact that the territory rear supply centers will begin to work at practical planning for all types of supply, and to organize receipts from suppliers (including by direct contract), storage, and distribution to consumers. Its function will also include seasonal preparation of agricultural items, commercial and consumer services, bath and laundry service, and repair of gear and equipment of the rear. Large monetary resources, which earlier were in the central directorates and districts, will be concentrated in the hands of the command. With allowance for market conditions, the centers themselves will purchase many types of oils and lubricants, clothing items, accessories, special clothing, and of course, food from local enterprises. This is where the accounting and record-keeping, monitoring and auditing functions will be concentrated. We already have experience in supplying the centers and bases with modern organizational equipment, communications and automation devices.

[Altunin] One question: since the newly created centers are being given such broad authority in rear support operations, what will the rear services of the districts and the central directorates do?

[Churanov] That's a legitimate question. First of all, these structures are even now undergoing a respectable reduction in staff. Second, and most importantly, by freeing the specialists of the rear services directorate of the districts and fleets from the need to constantly expend their intellectual and physical energies and time in performing the routine tasks of troop supply (after all, the rear services of the district must practically "drag themselves" to every unit), we are giving an opportunity to the "district people" to work at the vital questions of combat and mobilization readiness. And this means the accumulation and echeloning of material resources, replenishment of stores, and organization of the training process. At the same time, accounting and supervision and the struggle with theft and losses, will be improved.

As for the functions of the central directorates, they must determine the strategic line of development of their services: as before, as long as the present state structure lasts, I would say they should maintain a synchronous link with the ministries and departments "feeding" the rear, conduct organizational work in the field, and periodically audit the services.

[Altunin] Does the territorial system affect the rear services of the armed services. They have always somehow stood aloof.

[Churanov] Aloof is the right word for it. Before the rear services were based primarily on the "ground troops." Now incidentally, the Ground Troops Have created their own rear services. And the Rear of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will include the rear structures of all the armed services. So the territorial supply centers will be quite directly involved in supply of units and formations of all the troops in a given region.

We are "pulling" all the rear specialists from aviation and air defense into the centers. Incidentally, if the other services participate (and not only the rear services) and our territorial complex becomes more solid and extensive, our work can only gain from that

We believe that a territorial system which is simple in structure and economical should assure autonomy of supply of the military garrisons.

## INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

### Protocol of Latvian-Russian Meeting on Troop Withdrawal

*93UN0417A Riga VS-SM in Russian 13 Nov 92 p 1*

[Protocol signed by S. Zотов, head of the Russian Federation delegation, and J. Dinevics, head of the Latvian Republic delegation: "Protocol of the Meeting of State Delegations of the Russian Federation and the Latvian Republic on the Question of the Withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the former USSR under the Jurisdiction of the Russian Federation from the Territory of the Latvian Republic, 23-24 October 1992, Moscow"]

[Text]

1. In accordance with a previously achieved agreement, negotiations of state delegations of the Russian Federation and of the Latvian Republic took place in Moscow on 23-24 October 1992.

2. On the side of the Latvian Republic the delegation was headed by State Minister J. Dinevics.

On the side of the Russian Federation—S. Zотов, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.

3. A range of questions concerning the complete withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the former USSR under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation deployed there from the territory of the Latvian Republic, as well as certain problems of economic relations, was discussed.

4. The parties agreed on a number of points in the course of the discussion of the draft agreement on the question of the withdrawal of troops; however, differences on fundamental questions were not eliminated.

5. The Latvian side reaffirmed its position on the need to complete the total withdrawal of the troops in 1993 without any prior conditions.

The Latvian side has in mind the withdrawal of all troops, including the radar station in Skrunda, the dates for the closing down of which can be fixed by a separate agreement.

The Russian side does not exclude the possibility of withdrawing the troops in 1994 if the questions which make up the well-known "package" of Russian proposals of 6 August 1992 are resolved.

6. The Russian side again reaffirmed the prime importance which it gives to the problem of normalizing the legal status of the non-indigenous portion of the population of Latvia, including former members of the armed forces. It bases itself on the fact that the Agreement on the withdrawal of troops ought not to affect the legal personality of these persons, and primarily their property and housing rights.

7. The parties reaffirmed their fundamental positions with respect to rights to real property.

The Latvian side adheres to the position that all real property under the jurisdiction of the armed forces of the Russian Federation located on the territory of the Latvian Republic is the property of the Latvian Republic.

The Russian side considers that the Russian Federation, as the successor of the former USSR, retains the right of state ownership to the property of the Armed Forces under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and stationed on the territory of the Latvian Republic.

The parties agreed to seek a solution regarding the military enterprises of the Ministry of Defense, having in mind the ensuring of their normal functioning and the preservation of the employment of the personnel of these enterprises.

8. For the purpose of accelerating and regulating the process of the withdrawal of the troops, the Russian delegation proposed that draft Russian-Latvian agreements prepared by experts of both sides be submitted for the consideration of the governments of the Russian Federation and of the Latvian Republic:

—on the procedure for the crossing of the state border of the Latvian Republic by persons who are members of the Russian Armed Forces;

—on the procedure for the use of territorial waters, ports, and port installations by Russian Armed Forces;

—on railroad shipments of military stores of the Russian Armed Forces through the territory of the Latvian Republic during the period of their withdrawal from the territory of Latvia and the procedure for clearing operations regarding them;

—on the procedure for providing pensions to pensioners from among the members of the armed forces of the former USSR and the members of their families;

—on the procedure for carrying out customs formalities during the period of the withdrawal of the Armed Forces and Border Troops of the former USSR from the territory of the Latvian Republic.

9. The adoption of the "Provisional Statute on the Procedure for Movement of the Armed Forces under the Jurisdiction of the Russian Federation through the Territory of the Latvian Republic and their Crossing of the State Border of the Latvian Republic" was appealed against by the Russian side. This document goes against previously achieved agreements at the level of state delegations to abstain from uncoordinated unilateral actions. The Russian delegation informed the Latvian side that for this reason the command of the Northwestern Group of Forces and the Baltic Fleet cannot accept it for implementation.

The Latvian side bases itself on the fact that until a basic agreement regarding the withdrawal of the troops is concluded the Latvian authorities are compelled to regulate the conditions for the sojourn of Russian troops in the territory of Latvia.

The Latvian side expressed concern about the continuing violations of the sea and air space of the Latvian Republic on the part of the Russian Armed Forces, the conducting of target practice by Russian airplanes and warships in Latvian territory, and the entry of Armed Forces personnel without coordination with the appropriate authorities of the Latvian Republic.

The Russian side raised the question of the cancellation of the duties on fuel imported for the forces of the Baltic Fleet temporarily deployed in Latvia which have been illegally introduced by the Latvian side.

10. The parties defined the range of questions of a fundamental character on which agreement has not been successfully achieved and which require the adoption of political decisions:

- the time periods for the withdrawal of the troops,
- the right of ownership to real property,
- strategic installations,
- the legal personality of part of the former members of the armed forces and the members of their families, including their property and housing rights.

11. The delegations agreed to hold the next round of negotiations tentatively in the middle of November this year.

#### Kasatonov Protests Ukraine Actions on Black Sea Fleet

93UM0238C Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY  
in Russian 27 Nov 92 p 13

[Report by Aleksandr Stukalin: "Fleet Commander Indignant Over Actions Taken by Ukrainian Ministry of Defense: Admiral Kasatonov Protests"]

[Text] Yesterday Vasiliy Durdinets, first deputy representative of the Ukrainian Supreme Council, and Yuriy Yarov, deputy representative of the Russian Supreme Soviet, received an official protest from Admiral Igor Kasatonov, acting commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

In this document Kasatonov sharply expressed his indignation over the continuing illegal activity of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense aimed at the unilateral seizure and reassignment of subordination of units and subdivisions of the Black Sea Fleet. The admiral notes, in particular, the illegal reassignment of subordination of the main fleet transshipment base for fuel and lubricating materials, which ensures the combat readiness of approximately 1,000 ships and vessels of Russia's largest naval operational-strategic group, whereas Ukraine's navy has only a few ships.

In Kasatonov's opinion, the directives and orders issued by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense pertaining to the Black Sea Fleet are utterly uncoordinated with the Russian Ministry of Defense. And in the very near future this could lead to a "complete destabilization of the situation in the fleet." As an example, the admiral cites the following order issued by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense: "On the Procedure for Financing Capital Construction for Ukraine's Naval Forces and the Black Sea Fleet During the Transition Period." According to this order, the construction of facilities and the distribution of housing shall take place only through the financial service of Ukraine's Naval Department. From Kasatonov's point of view, this order "is a senseless and illegal act with regard to tens of thousands of officers of the Black Sea Fleet by comparison with hundreds of officers and warrant officers of Ukraine's Naval Forces."

#### Ukrainian MFA Protests Russian Black Sea Infractions

93UM0238B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian  
28 Nov 92 p 1

[Statement by Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "A Protest Note"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent a protest note to the Russian Federation's Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the sale by the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense of operational reserve supplies belonging to the Black Sea Fleet, which was stationed at former naval bases of the former USSR Navy in Bulgaria.

This note pointed out, in particular, that—with the direct connivance of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense and the high command of the Black Sea Fleet and failure to heed statements made on several occasions by Ukraine—the theft and resale of property belonging to the Black Sea Fleet has been carried out.

Taking into consideration what was noted above, the Ukrainian side insists that a halt be called to the illegal acts committed by the Russian Federation's state administrative organs with regard to the resale and illegal export of property belonging to the Black Sea Fleet.

#### Ukrainian Defense Ministry on Stopping Russian Black Sea Violations

93UM0238A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian  
28 Nov 92 p 1

[Statement by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Press Service: "The Situation Around the Black Sea Fleet Will Be Under Control"]

[Text] Analysis of the events which took place after the signing by Ukraine and the Russian Federation of the Yalta Agreement, dated 3 August 1992 and entitled "On the Reasons for the Formation of a Ukrainian Naval Force and a Russian Naval Fleet at the Base of the Former USSR's Black Sea Fleet," shows that the efforts of the parties concerned to settle the problem of the Black Sea are being undermined by the illegal actions of the high command of the Russian Federation Navy and the former commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Igor Kasatonov. They have continued to ignore the agreements reached in Yalta and have grossly violated the national laws of Ukraine, as well as the norms of international law.

Numerous facts serve to confirm this. Thus, for example, warships of the Black Sea Fleet are being used by the fleet high command without coordination with the Ukrainian side for carrying out missions beyond Ukraine's borders, including some in the regions of interethnic conflicts.

In violation of the existing interstate agreements between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, personnel changes and shifts in the leadership of the Black Sea Fleet are being done in a unilateral manner. Without the consent of the Ukrainian side, by an order from the Commander in Chief of the Russian Navy, Vice Admiral Svyatashov was appointed as this fleet's chief of staff. There continue to be instances of discreditation, removal from posts, and dismissals of

officers and warrant officers who have taken an oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine.

Unprecedented scope has been assumed by the illegal actions of the high command of the Russian Federation's Navy and the Black Sea Fleet, connected with the export of arms, equipment, and material assets belonging to the fleet to Russian territory, the sale and transfer for leasing purposes of various commercial structures of movable property and real estate. This has led to a violation of the fleet's infrastructure and a weakening of its combat readiness.

Provocatory utterances continue to be made by Admiral Kasatonov concerning a change in the existing territorial borders between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

The press service of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has been empowered to declare that such a state of affairs cannot be tolerated any longer. The actions committed by the high command of the Black Sea Fleet and the Russian Navy have been directed, in practice, at disrupting the efforts of the Ukrainian and Russian Federation delegations in seeking solutions acceptable to both sides to problems of the Black Sea Fleet. They grossly violate the status of this fleet during the transition period, as established in Yalta.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, guided by the decree of the Ukrainian Supreme Council "On Military Formations in Ukraine," the edict of the president of Ukraine "On Necessary Measures for Building the Ukrainian Armed Forces," as well as the Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation dated 3 August 1992 "On the Principles of Forming a Ukrainian Naval Force and a Russian Navy at the Base of the Former USSR's Black Sea Fleet," has been compelled to take the most decisive measures for the social and legal protection of its military-service personnel, to prevent the illegal and massive export, and sale of arms, military equipment, and facilities, as well as the squandering of Ukrainian lands which had previously been allocated for use by the Black Sea Fleet.

Based on an order issued by Colonel General Konstantin Morozov, Ukraine's minister of defense, the utilization and sale of arms, military equipment, material and financial assets belonging to the Black Sea Fleet is being placed under strict monitoring controls on Ukraine's territory. All illegally removed or dismissed military-service personnel—who are citizens of Ukraine and who have performed service in the Black Sea Fleet—shall be assigned to approved civilian positions within the Ukrainian Naval Force prior to 20 December 1992.

In order to investigate and study the facts concerning the illegal actions committed by the high command of the Black Sea Fleet, a special commission of the Ministry of Defense has been set up. It will turn over the materials resulting from its work to the Ukrainian procurator general's office.

All violations of Ukrainian laws and the interstate agreements reached with regard to the Black Sea will be interdicted and cut short by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense in close mutual cooperation with the Ukrainian Border Troops, Security Service, procuracy organs, and Ministry of Internal Affairs.

### Russian Misuse of Black Sea Fleet Property Asserted

*93UM0239A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
28 Nov 92 p 1*

[Article by Sergey Balykov and Mykola Zayka, Ukrinform correspondents: "The Commercial Aspect of the Fleet"]

[Text] The farther we proceed, the more frequently we learn about documents which attest to the sale to the commanders of the Black Sea Fleet of the military property and support facilities of the fleet's infrastructure.

In March of this year, for example, 70 percent of the space of the Black Sea Fleet's proving grounds was leased to a commercial bank. As a result of this, the fleet lost the possibility of performing maintenance, certain stands for testing new equipment, which—because of this—had to be dismantled. At that same time, by orders of Admiral Igor Kasatonov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, a hectare of good land located on the territory of the Kozach Base was transferred to a small enterprise entitled "Samarkand." The goal seemed to be a noble one—to improve the supply of carpentry and metal products to the fleet's military units. What really happened here was the construction of multistory dachas.

Another "operation" was connected with the MP [expansion unknown] "Helios," but this one was connected with AI-93 brand gasoline. It passed through the fleet's Base No 688. The total sum of this operation amounts to about 30 million karbovantsy.

And hundreds of tonnes of fuel were also "redeployed" abroad with the knowledge of Igor Kasatonov and sold to a concern with the intriguing name of "Interkom-Center-Formula 7," which has its headquarters in...Moscow. By the way, the grounds for this operation—as was likewise true for the "carpentry and metal products," was also a humane consideration—paying off the accounts for building housing for military-service personnel. But it has been brought about now not in Ukraine, but in Novorosiysk. And the money with which the fuel was purchased in the beginning was taken non-reimbursably from the pockets of Ukrainian taxpayers.

By the way, following a visit, the Novorosiysk commander of the Black Sea Fleet gave a cruiser-cutter to the local naval chief. Whose account was it charged to?

A self-perception as a dominant master evidently also guided Admiral Kasatonov at the time when he approved the contractual agreement with regard to buying and selling the facility known as "221"—a reserve-supply command center for the fleet. It is made up of a complex of administrative buildings, residential space, and structures housing economic and everyday-type facilities. This station—which is essentially a military place—was acquired for a bargain price (60 million karbovantsy in 1990 prices) by the Lela Aviation Company.

"Our commission and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense," comments Oleksandr Tarasenko, deputy head of the Ukrainian Supreme Council Commission on Matters of Defense and State Security, has—on more than one occasion drawn

the attention of the citizens to the irresponsible acts being committed by the high command of the Black Sea Fleet, and especially by Admiral Igor Kasatonov. The leadership of the Black Sea Fleet—under the guise of concern for preserving and safeguarding the unity of the fleet and maintaining its combat readiness—has more than once endeavored to destabilize the situation, to complicate the search for mutually acceptable solutions with regard to dividing the Black Sea Fleet.

The gross violations of Ukrainian law in connection with the sale and barter of the Black Sea Fleet's material assets, as well as the unjustifiable deeds committed by Admiral Kasatonov and his subordinates, have become the objects of review and investigation by the fleet's military procuracy. In particular, for the sale by the Black Sea Fleet of Facility 221 to the Lela Aviation Line the Ukrainian Procurator General's Office has instigated a criminal case. In addition to that, a summons to appear in an arbitration court was issued to the Republic of Crimea, which recognized the contract as invalid, and which has obligated each of the parties concerned to return to the other party everything which it acquired from it. Verification and auditing the records are likewise being continued with respect to other instances of violations of Ukrainian laws, including the instance of selling land.

In connection with this, the following questions have arisen: What does the world of Admiral Kasatonov's commercial activity have to do with maintaining the fleet in a state of combat readiness? And do the admiral's statutory duties and obligations include the right to engage in the widespread selling of the fleet's property, along with the dismantling of its installations, arms, and other equipment?

But the most important question is: Where did the money earned from the sale of the Black Sea Fleet's property go? Well certainly, in accordance with the Ukrainian laws, all commercial activity must be conducted openly, be under the monitoring controls of the ships' crews and that of certain specific sections and units. And the money realized from the sale of the fleet's property should be channeled exclusively into building housing for officers, warrant officers, petty officers, and enlisted men without apartments.

We anticipate that the investigation will provide the answers to this. And each person responsible for abuses will be charged accordingly. It is to be wished that this responsible conclusion will be drawn by each person for himself and for other service personnel which are engaging in such "activity."

P.S. Ukrinform has copies of the documents which confirm the facts concerned with the squandering of the fleet's property.

#### Ethnic Russian Servicemen Express Desire To Serve in Homeland

93UM0209A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 4 Dec 92 p 7

[Article from Bishkek by ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent Valeriy Kuklin: "To the Homeland of the Forefathers"]

[Text] Around 700 Russian-speaking draftees from Kyrgyzstan preferred service in Russia to service in their own republic. There are numerous reasons, but the main one is the desire of Slavs to serve their time and remain in the homeland of the forefathers. This was how draftees of one of the rayon military commissariats of Bishkek explained their decision to me. And one added that he was prompted to make this decision by a series of articles in newspapers about the violation of military regulations in the local army and about dedovshchina and other outrages.

It is difficult to demand words of patriotism from the present very practical teenagers, especially as this word has acquired a very diffuse nature for Russians living on the territory of Central Asian republics. All of them perceive service in the armed forces as a forced obligation. But the fact that they do not wish to take part in interethnic conflicts is gratifying.

During interviews the military commissariats tell the Slavs that the State Committee for Defense of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan is accommodating them and permitting them to serve on the territory of Russia.

## UKRAINE

#### Odessa Military District Tactical Exercises Evaluated

#### Odessa District Commander Assesses Tactical Training

93UM0171A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian  
3 Nov 92 p 1

[Interview with Odessa Military District Commander Lieutenant General Vitaliy Grigoryevich Radetskiy by NARODNA ARMIYA special correspondent Major Mikhail Kaminskiy, date and place not specified, under rubric "Post-Exercise Interview": "Odessa Military District Commander Lieutenant General Vitaliy Radetskiy: We Will Upgrade Tactical Proficiency, Although This Is Not Simple To Do Today"; photograph of Radetskiy included with interview]

[Text] It already has been reported that live fire regimental tactical exercises took place in Odessa Military District [MD]. Immediately following the end of all phases, our correspondent asked Odessa MD Commander Lieutenant General Vitaliy Radetskiy to tell about their results and how district units and subunits are approaching the end-of-training-period performance evaluation for the current year.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Comrade Commander, the end-of-training-period performance evaluation is coming up. With what results are district formations and units approaching it?

[Radetskiy] Generally speaking, with various results. For example, today artillery subunits and air defense units prepared better for it. Tank and motorized rifle units were somewhat worse. They worked less with the equipment and did not go into the field that often because of the shortage of vehicle resources.

Of course, the commanders in these units still tried to find a solution. They worked more often in gunnery training facilities and on firing ranges and rehearsed operational training missions more in tactical drill problems although, as we know, field activities and tactical exercises provide the greatest training effect. This axiom was confirmed once again by the exercise in Colonel Aleksandr Antoshkin's tank regiment. I hope results in the end-of-training-period performance evaluation will be quite good for the district as a whole.

**[NARODNA ARMIYA]** Several years ago it was difficult to surprise anyone with regimental—never mind regimental—with division tactical exercises. Today we have begun to forget about them little by little. Then suddenly, when the young Ukrainian Armed Forces are lacking everything without exception, as they say, Odessa MD decides to hold regimental tactical exercises. What is this? A desire somehow to stand out or was the exercise planned earlier?

**[Radetskiy]** In fact, these regimental tactical exercises are the first in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and I believe it is not necessary to explain why they are the first. In time, I assume, we will hold activities similar to this regularly, but again, based on requirements of combat training and our capabilities.

With respect to the second part of your question, we were not trying to bypass or surprise someone with the regimental exercises. The important thing is we pursued the goal of teaching personnel to act skillfully in offensive combat and rehearsing problems of coordination among subunits of different combat arms, and I dare say we successfully accomplished this task.

**[NARODNA ARMIYA]** Evidently other goals also were set?

**[Radetskiy]** Of course. We especially held command training conferences in parallel with the exercises in the interests of better quality of troop training. We also gave the exercises a research character, so to speak. Officers of the district staff, and particularly of the combat training directorate, studied questions involving delivery of fires and organization of battlefield coordination among subunits of different combat arms. The results will be generalized, studied and analyzed in a most thorough manner and then sent to the units.

**[NARODNA ARMIYA]** Vitaliy Grigoryevich, life forces the military also to count money under conditions of the budding market economy. The past exercises probably also had their price? Tell me, please, what it was.

**[Radetskiy]** I cannot give it now, but of course we are figuring up the expenses. And in the future we will introduce a mandatory section on its cost to the list of questions for preparation of a tactical exercise. This will obligate commanders to carefully figure the preliminary cost of an activity and correlate it with actual outlays. It would appear that after this the number of those who love to squander the people's money right and left, as they say, will be somewhat diminished.

**[NARODNA ARMIYA]** But will such rationalism not have a negative effect on troop proficiency?

**[Radetskiy]** I will try to prove it will not. First of all, sensible economy cannot be a hindrance to combat training. I emphasize the word sensible. Secondly, it disciplines a commander and forces him to look for the most rational ways of accomplishing a particular task. In other words, to paraphrase a statement by military leader Aleksandr Suvorov, victory in battle, even practice battle, must be achieved not by the amount of assets put into it, but by their skilled use. This is very important today.

**[NARODNA ARMIYA]** Continuing the subject of the deficit, I wish to recall one fact which appeared briefly in the press this spring. It was to the effect that Odessa MD helped farmers with fuel for conducting the sowing campaign. Did you not harm yourselves by this noble gesture?

**[Radetskiy]** In fact, when the problem of fuel arose for the farmers we did allocate a certain amount of POL to them. In this connection we had to adjust combat training plans somewhat and take account of the factor of economizing on expenditure of vehicle resources, which in the final account permitted the troops to keep within reduced fuel consumption rates and perform missions at hand.

**[NARODNA ARMIYA]** In short, you economized?

**[Radetskiy]** Generally, yes. Moreover, the farms soon returned a portion of the fuel to us as promised.

**[NARODNA ARMIYA]** Vitaliy Grigoryevich, over the last several months many officers have come into district troops from other states of the former Union. Please describe their professional and command proficiency.

**[Radetskiy]** Basically real patriots of Ukraine are coming to us. Many left high positions and an orderly everyday life at the previous duty station and returned home to the Motherland with a sincere desire to serve her faithfully, and they are confirming this by specific actions from their first steps. It is no secret that Ukrainians are campaigners by nature—in the good sense of the word, of course. Ukrainians love to serve and love to work, and this cannot be taken from them, although in speaking of armed defenders as a whole, one also should speak of representatives of other nationalities. And having taken the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine, they are honorably fulfilling their constitutional duty.

With respect to the level of professional training, it is not identical for officers coming to us. For example, those who transferred from the Western and Northern groups of forces appear better in this respect, and this is understandable. There were greater opportunities for their professional growth there.

Things are somewhat worse for officers who arrived from the Transcaucasus and Far East. Our task is to help them restore lost professional and methods skills in a short time, and much is being done in district forces in this direction. The training conferences which I mentioned earlier also can serve as an example of this.

**[NARODNA ARMIYA]** The topic of the Army and Ukrainian Armed Forces today is one of the most timely topics in the mass media and on the lips of simple people. Everyone is

interested in it, and naturally so are the parents—the fathers and mothers of soldiers. At times even in letters to the editor they ask how safe exercises and military service are and they inquire as to the arrangements for soldiers' everyday life in the field. What will you say on this account?

[Radetskiy] We understand the parents and wholly share their concern. At the same time we are doing everything possible and at times impossible to ensure that mothers' hearts are not wrung with a heavy presentiment of misfortune. Our commanders regard safety measures in soldiers' day-to-day lives and especially in tactical exercises as of paramount importance. They try in every way to teach subordinates to take care of themselves and they safeguard subordinates from any dangers. Mothers entrusted their sons to us and we are obligated to return their sons to them alive and well.

In tactical exercises everyday matters also were in the commanders' field of view. Soldiers were warmly dressed and did not starve. In addition to three hot meals a day, each received a supplementary ration in the exercises.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] And the final question. True, it is a bit off the subject. Our newspaper recently finished publishing draft Ukrainian Armed Forces regulations. They contain a multitude of new words and terms which are received ambivalently in the troops. What is your opinion on this account?

[Radetskiy] We carefully followed these articles in Odessa MD. Excerpts from newspapers were made in subunits and put together in special folders. In other words, all officers and men took an interest in familiarizing themselves with the drafts. Opinions coming from the troops presently are being gathered and generalized. All of them later will be handed over to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

What can be said of the new words and terms? I agree that some of them cause some bewilderment among officers and men. For example, it is hard for them to accept the military ranks and names of subunits which were inherent, say, to the times of the Cossacks. What is to be done here? Especially as today some ranks and terms are used in many armies of the world. This includes "lieutenant," "captain," "platoon" and "battalion." Why not leave them in our Army? At any rate, I think that the most appropriate and acceptable terms will be found during discussion of the drafts and we will have our own regulations, which will serve the cause of Ukrainian Armed Forces organizational development.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Thank you for the interview, comrade commander!

#### District Commander on Purposes of Live Fire Training

93UM0171B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian  
4 Nov 92 p 2

[Commentary by Odessa Military District Commander Lieutenant General Vitaliy Radetskiy]

[Text] The live fire tactical exercise is the highest form of unit and subunit training. And not just the training of

troops. It presents a good opportunity to objectively and comprehensively determine the personnel's level of professional proficiency and the degree of their readiness to perform difficult operational training missions. For well-known reasons, we are deprived for now of opportunities to regularly organize exercises like the present ones. Say what you like, today these activities cost much money and assets. Nevertheless, we assume that in time, as in past years, they will become a customary part of troop life.

With respect to these exercises, they have become possible thanks to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, which not only gave the "ok," but also helped with everything needed for their successful organization.

In preparing the regimental tactical exercise we proceeded above all from its usefulness and advisability. Yes, it could have been held in a "narrow" circle, so to speak, and we could have set and achieved the goal of arming the tank regiment's commanders with specific knowledge and skills of offensive combat, and probably hardly anyone would have reproached us for this. But we took a different approach. We timed the exercise for the training conferences for army commanding generals and for formation, brigade and regimental commanders. In taking that step we proceeded above all from the fact that the majority of commanders, especially those recently assigned to regiments and divisions, have not yet once experienced for themselves all the weight of that enormous amount of work which they have to perform both prior to and during combat. That is first. Secondly, we gave the exercises a research character in the interests of quality troop training. In particular, district staff officers will study most thoroughly questions of delivery of fires and battlefield coordination among different combat arms.

I cannot say that no one worked on this in previous years. Work was done in this direction, but its results were far from always introduced to the practice of training commanders and their subordinates. Today, based on features of Ukrainian Armed Forces training, it is not simply that we should, but we are obligated to get out of every exercise all that is valuable and useful and that best contributes to growth in the personnel's tactical proficiency. Otherwise we will not achieve an increase in unit and subunit combat readiness or avoid miscalculations and omissions in holding exercises on any level and scale.

#### Intensity, Broader Ramifications of Training Noted

93UM0171C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian  
4 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA special correspondents Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Shvyrev and Major Mikhail Kaminskiy: "Exercises Are Not for a 'Narrow' Circle"]

[Text] Before this trip to Odessa MD each of us had attended tactical exercises on more than one occasion, and we honestly admit that it was far from always we succeeded in meeting commanding generals who would have given the attention to their conduct Vitaliy Grigoryevich did.

Someone may say on this account that difficulties in organizing combat training obligate him to act in that way. Possibly. It really is not easy to train personnel now. For a number of well-known reasons, the ranges where just in the recent past soldiers day and night learned the science of winning today function with an incomplete load. Subunit long-distance marches also have become extremely rare. Therefore if one does succeed in holding any kind of significant activity, if only similar to this exercise, then leaders do try to "squeeze" everything possible and at times also impossible from it.

Yes, in the past no funds were spared for combat training; no one ever figured up how much a trip to the field or a battalion training exercise cost, for example. But then—and one should not forget this—times were different and there were different approaches to troop training. Now the situation is different. Views on professional training of armed defenders became different with Ukraine gaining independence and building its own Armed Forces. Now a course has been set toward a sharp reduction in large-scale activities, but while retaining and even increasing the intensity of troop training through an increase in the number and length of exercises at the squad, crew, team, platoon and company level. By the way, regimental tactical exercises also will be held, but once every few years.

Based on what has been said, it becomes understandable that the regimental tactical exercise now has become far from an ordinary activity. This also means it is in no way suitable to prepare for it in the old way. This probably explains such careful attention to the exercise and its organization by everyone beginning with the regimental commander and ending with the district commanding general, and the attempt to get the maximum of what is valuable and useful out of it so as to have a good knowledge and clear picture of the dynamics of modern combat in the future and always have at hand scientifically substantiated calculations on its particular problems.

The decision to show this exercise to army commanding generals and to district formation and unit commanders also should be considered sensible in this respect, since many of them do not yet have sufficient knowledge and skills in conducting exercises. That this is really so is confirmed by the following example. In opening the training conference, Vitaliy Grigoryevich casually asked one of the officers to name the area in which Colonel Aleksandr Antoshkin's tank regiment was located at that moment. After some reflection the officer named it, but unfortunately incorrectly. In a different situation the commanding general possibly would have put the unlucky commander to shame, but realizing that other officers were standing next to him who also had to work on themselves a great deal, he did not do this, but only called on the conferees to regard what they would be shown and told during the activities with all seriousness.

And that day they did have something to see. Several training points were set up in the attack position of the tank regiment (whose personnel, by the way, did not stop preparing for the offensive for a moment). Without naming them all, let us dwell only on those which previously were

not even planned at such conferences. Above all we have in mind the training point at which armament and property of a tank company and a motorized rifle company were displayed according to a wartime T/O&E. After familiarizing themselves with everything that was here, even generals and officers grown wise with life experience were struck by the presence of everything without exception, so to speak. And they probably were surprised not so much by lack of knowledge of something as by the habit of taking their subordinates into the field or out for exercises without much of anything, with a minimum of what was needed for their more or less normal existence.

Conferees also discovered much that was new for themselves during familiarization with the regimental rear command and control facility, with operational and tactical level advanced communications equipment and so on. The attack position of Lieutenant Colonel Anatoliy Gashchuk's tank battalion, prepared according to all rules, also generated no less interest in the generals and officers. What is typical is that the site selected for accommodating this subunit's equipment and people was not the most appropriate, and this was not done by chance. It is not especially difficult to conceal a battalion, say, in the woods or a ravine, but to do this on the open steppe! Both art and sharpness must be displayed here, and Lieutenant Colonel Gashchuk's subordinates demonstrated them to the full extent.

#### **Mechanized Division Commander on Training Monitoring**

*93UM0171D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian  
4 Nov 92 p 2*

[Commentary by Mechanized Division Commander Major General Valeriy Venger]

[Text] Do you know what commanders least like to do in preparing for battle? Preliminary work. For example, they have more than enough desire and endeavor for taking the battalion, company or platoon along a difficult route, going out on ground reconnaissance or zeroing weapons. But some officers simply have a distaste for working up their map, working one more time on the terrain model, or fulfilling measures for camouflaging equipment in the attack position. Knowing this, as exercise director I constantly monitored these matters and if I noticed that some subunit was not giving proper attention to classes on the terrain model, for example, I placed the strictest demand on the guilty parties for this. And I never tried to turn demand into a dressing-down, for it is enough to show and tell some young officers how to perform a certain task better and with more quality, and everything will fall into place.

And in general patience and composure in training subordinates—for which the district commander constantly calls, by the way—is repaid a hundredfold enormously faster than conversations in a heightened tone of voice. Colonel Aleksandr Antoshkin, Lieutenant Colonel Anatoliy Gashchuk, Captain Aleksandr Karpenko and Senior Lieutenant Yevgeniy Zhagan impress me more than other exercise participants in this respect. By the way, you can convince yourselves of this by visiting the tank regiment and the subunits attached to and supporting it in the offensive.

### Tank Battalion's Problems, Lessons Learned Outlined

93UM0171E Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian  
4 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA special correspondents Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Shvyrev and Major Mikhail Kaminskiy: "When Hands Are Untied..."]

[Text] We arrived in Lieutenant Colonel Anatoliy Gashchuk's tank battalion not long before the offensive. All measures of preparing for it already were behind them here, and those which still had to be accomplished were done in a calm atmosphere, without pressure or urging from the commander.

"In my years of Army service I have had repeated occasion to take part in exercises on a most varied scale," said Lieutenant Colonel Gashchuk when we met him, "but in none of them do I recall things working to one's satisfaction without haste, nervous strain and receiving even more valuable instructions. It is quite a different picture in the present exercises. We battalion commanders have been given more independence and opportunities for showing initiative and imagination. Strictly speaking, it should not be otherwise. Limiting one's freedom to act, excessive coddling, and constant summons to higher headquarters for clarification and correction of the most insignificant matters not only do not contribute to creating a businesslike atmosphere, but they also have a pernicious effect on subordinates' attitude toward performing their duties. Thank God, that is not the case now..."

In listening to Anatoliy Filippovich, at first we imagined such an idyllic picture prevailing in the tactical exercise and specifically in his battalion. But as we spoke with him and his subordinates, we soon learned about many difficulties which the tankers encountered here at the range. In particular, until recently the most burning question involved the makeup of companies and platoons. Some of them went into the field without having even half of their personnel strength. True, it is possible to learn to fight even with that number of people, but is it then justified to spend enormous amounts?

"We of course found a solution," says Gashchuk. "We brought them up to strength with specialists from various district units. But take a look at who came to us: a former pontonier, laboratory assistant, motorized rifleman... It was well there was time for retraining them, and we made full use of it. We put the novices through driving, firing, and platoon and company exercises on an equal with the other soldiers, after appropriate training of course. They also gained good practical skills during the tactical drill problems. Today you can't recognize even yesterday's ignoramuses: they fire and operate fighting vehicles no worse than experienced tankers. I believe not one of them will let us down in real combat."

Battalion officers, many of whom had not had occasion to really smell the powder before this, as they say, also received good training in a little over two months at the range. For example, senior lieutenants Oleg Kurasov and Igor Murigin received confident skills in organizing for combat and

exercising command and control of companies, and the same goes for lieutenants Sergey Bendrat, Valentin Osadchiy and Aleksandr Parkhomenko with respect to platoons. Parkhomenko, by the way, finished military school out of his field, but was able to requalify from motorized rifleman to tanker in a short time and was one of the first to receive an outstanding grade in firing the authorized round.

We probably did not meet so many young officers in a single other battalion of the regiment (and we were in almost all of them). Even the battalion commander would not be called an "old-timer." He only just became a lieutenant colonel. And how everyone works! They are ahead in many combat training indicators and stand out for the best in readiness for upcoming combat. For example, no company or platoon commander had to be reminded twice as soon as equipment was to be dispersed in the attack position or corner reflectors set up to deceive "enemy" electronic reconnaissance. True, a person who has been at this range at least once might object that the terrain here is level as a frying-pan; try not to dig tanks into the ground and they will be visible a mile off. No, this is not what obligated the officers and their subordinates to reliably conceal the fighting vehicles from outside eyes. They were motivated above all by the desire to learn to fight in a modern way and the desire not to sully the honor of their own collective. Would that every soldier of our young Armed Forces had such an attitude toward the job. How much easier and simpler the missions facing them would be accomplished!

I would not like to have such a detailed story about Lieutenant Colonel Gashchuk and his subordinates to generate the thought in someone that the correspondents allegedly were brought to the best battalion in the regiment and they laid it on thick. By no means did any one of us set that goal. Moreover (I repeat), on that same day we visited Lieutenant Boris Dudka's reconnaissance personnel, Captain Anatoliy Muzychenko's motorized riflemen, Major Vladimir Don's tankers, the artillerymen of Captain Viktor Tarashchan and Major Aleksandr Zelinskiy, airborne troopers, combat engineers, chemical warfare personnel... And no matter where the range roads and paths led us, everywhere we met privates, NCO's and officers to whom more than one article could be devoted (which we will do). Well, because of not having the newspaper space today we are simply forced to limit ourselves to a story about them and their deeds in telegraphic fashion...

### Tank Regiment Commander Outlines Combined Arms Exercise

93UM0171F Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian  
4 Nov 92 p 2

[Commentary by Tank Regiment Commander Colonel Aleksandr Antoshkin]

[Text] One feature of modern combat is that the opposing side in which main, attached and supporting subunits act in rhythm, without the slightest hitch, is the one which gets the upper hand. In other words, they perform the assigned mission under a unified concept and plan. Of course the most unforeseen circumstances may arise in a real duel as well as in a practice duel with an "enemy." Then much will

depend on the commander and his ability to restore initiative lost through someone's fault... By the way (he looks at his watch), aviation will begin operating now, and not a minute earlier or a minute later. Then artillerymen, helicopter pilots, combat engineers and chemical warfare personnel will be committed in turn... Well, we will see what will come of this in the final account.

### Tank Regiment Involvement in Exercise Detailed

*93UM0171G Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian  
4 Nov 92 p 2*

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA special correspondents Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Shvyrev and Major Mikhail Kaminskiy: "Tankers Play First Fiddle"]

[Text] On approaching the FEBA the Mig-29's fire decoy flares and immediately deliver a bombing strike against a concentration of "enemy" personnel and equipment. In a few minutes there is a second strike against an advancing column. The air support permits combat outpost subunits to hold out for some time at their positions and prepare for an organized withdrawal to new ones.

A divisional artillery group and regimental artillery group enter battle at the designated hour. Major Aleksandr Zelinskiy's self-propelled howitzer battalion is part of one of them. We managed to visit this subunit on the day before, or more precisely immediately after they completed a march from the attack position to firing positions. Accustomed to performing such missions, they had dug into the ground reliably by day's end and reconnoitered targets.

We learned from a brief chat with Major Zelinskiy that his batteries were to take part in three fire assaults and in laying barrage and concentrated fire in front of the counterattacking "enemy." The option of delivering a strike against unplanned targets also was not precluded. And now they joined the action.

"Everything is going according to plan," says Colonel Vladimir Nekhayev, the division artillery commander, and adds: "Subunits participating in the fire assault are acting cohesively, they are being controlled stably and, judging from observed bursts, they are hitting targets without a miss."

...Despite losses suffered, the "enemy" continues to advance stubbornly. And only after an airborne assault battalion of Lieutenant Colonel Aleksey Atroshchenko's airmobile brigade is committed does the "enemy" halt and assume a defense. A favorable opportunity is created for committing the tank regiment. Exercise Director Major General Valeriy Venger carefully estimates the situation at hand and issues necessary instructions to regimental commander Colonel Aleksandr Antoshkin...

The range ground shudders more and more often from bomb and shell bursts with each passing minute, and assault rifle and machinegun bursts and rounds from tanks conducting direct fire become more and more intensive. Air defense personnel are in readiness to open fire against airborne targets, chemical warfare personnel to lay down a smoke screen, and combat engineers to make passages in

minefields... Helicopters of First Class Military Pilot Major Aleksandr Ivlev's flight make a target run again and again and methodically lay free-flight rockets on a concentration of "enemy" personnel and equipment.

"...Crossed line of deployment into battalion columns..." and "...into company columns..." comes the familiar voice of Colonel Antoshkin from powerful loudspeakers set up in front of the observation tower. The rumble of approaching tanks grows with each passing minute, and then already they can be seen with the unaided eye. We look at our watches and estimate the distance left for first echelon battalions to cover to the final coordination line and note that Lieutenant Colonel Gashchuk's and Major Don's subordinates are going precisely to the second.

In observing the regimental subunits' deployment into platoon columns, we automatically recall Captain Anatoliy Muzychenko, commander of a motorized rifle company attached to Gashchuk's battalion. Anatoliy and Aleksandr [sic] at one time studied in the same military school and knew each other well. Having left for different ends of the former Union after finishing the military educational institution, they had not seen each other since then for almost 12 years. And then as fate willed it, the officers met, and not somewhere on leave, but in an exercise, where they still had not had time to have a serious talk. Nevertheless, it would appear that an opportunity will present itself for Gashchuk and Muzychenko to recall school years and have a talk about today and in particular about the battle, which for them already was not far off.

...It was "H" hour on the watch. Deploying into an extended line, the tank battalions and attached motorized rifle subunits swiftly burst onto the FEBA and opened up a hurricane of fire from all kinds of weapons. Companies of senior lieutenants Yuriy Podlosny and Oleg Kurasov and of captains Yuriy Sazhko, Anatoliy Muzychenko and Andrey Makarov confidently assaulted the "enemy." The defenders did not hold out against the tank pressure and began withdrawing, establishing strongpoints on some axes. Carefully observing their subordinates' actions, the battalion commanders quickly assessed the situation at hand and committed second echelon companies as necessary.

The moment when the "enemy" decided to deliver a counterthrust can be called the culmination of the offensive, but his plan did not catch the tank regiment commander unawares. Antoshkin halted the subunits of Lieutenant Colonel Gashchuk and Major Don on a favorable line and committed Major Satushev's battalion on the left flank. At the given moment the fresh forces proved to be most opportune. A brief duel followed and the offensive continued.

...Yesterday an end-of-training-period performance evaluation began in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Soldiers who took part in the tactical exercise also prepared for it, but life saw to it that the main test of professional maturity for them was the practice battle. In it they managed to give an honorable account of what they had studied in a year's time and what they had achieved in tactical, reconnaissance, fire, and special training, and this will count for them.

We hope the tankers, motorized riflemen, artillerymen, aviators, and combat engineers—in short, everyone who achieved success in the offensive combat—also will pass the other exams in the very same mood and will thereby worthily conclude the first training year in the Ukrainian Army

## BELARUS

### First Belarusian Military Journal to be Published

93UM0229B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 9 Dec 92 p 2

[Report under the rubric "From Our Information Bureau": "There Is to Be a First Belarusian Military Journal"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Valeriy Kovalev reports that the matter of establishing the first Belarusian military journal is being worked out in the Information Directorate of the Republic of Belarus. It is planned for the publication to cover the theory and praxis of military organizational development and the daily life and problems of the republic's armed forces. The first issue of the magazine will appear at the beginning of 1993.

## BALTIC STATES

### Deputies Criticized for Views on Defense, Security Structures

93UN0423A Riga ATMODA ATPUTAI in Latvian  
4 Nov 92 p 6

[Interview of Peteris Simsons, Chairman, Republic of Latvia Supreme Council Defense and Interior Affairs Commission by Janis Domburs: "Latvia's Guards—Are They Pigs at the Trough?"]

[Text] Fourteen months have passed since international recognition of the independence of the Republic of Latvia. In this time the size of Latvia's armed forces has grown significantly. But a state defense and security system still has not been created through legal regulations.

Legislative juridical aspects, state financial resources, service coefficients of effectiveness and their doubling, political activity on the eve of the Saeima elections—all of these things are the concern of the RL [Republic of Latvia] SC [Supreme Council] Defense and Interior Affairs Commission's Chairman PETERIS SIMSONS:

[Simsons] First of all, I would not want state defense and security to become a sphere used for partisan political purposes. Of course, disagreements are largely related to our poverty: If there is not enough for all, then everyone must first of all fend for himself. In my opinion the currently functioning organizations have been developed in an impartial manner. Every state must have an army, regardless of whether it is called an army or a defense force. Viewing it from the perspective of the interests of Latvia, such an appellation is even more appropriate. So a state also needs a police force. And it is very good if they are voluntary organizations, like our Home Guard, even more so because in Latvia and the Baltic states they have historical roots. One must ask:

### IN WHAT INSTANCE MUST THE PLACE AND FUNCTION OF THESE FORMATIONS BE DETERMINED, TO ASSURE THEM OF ONE "UMBRELLA" LAW?

Judging logically, that should be done by legislators in the Supreme Council. In my opinion it is also logical that for this purpose the SC has established and operates the defense and internal affairs commission, which reviews all proposals in this area. Of course, specific laws or concepts cannot be prepared without professional participation, so interested parties must also be invited to participate, including representatives of public organizations. Already now groups which work on state defense questions such as the PFL [Popular Front of Latvia], the National Soldiers Association and others put their part into this "common pot." That, it seems to me, is very good. But it is bad that the aforementioned scheme is not supported by Supreme Council deputies. I will mention an example: After review by our commission the legislative proposal developed by the defense ministry was submitted to the SC plenary session. And suddenly in the plenary session the conceptual formulations of the legislative proposal were either thrown out or transformed to their diametrically opposite theses. Here I note two tendencies: First, the desire of every deputy to affirm himself as an individual by casting doubt or imposing his opinions, while at the same time completely disregarding the fact that the proposal has been carefully worked out. Second, we have witnessed efforts by individual officials or groups of deputies to attain the option most favorable to their interests. The least of the evils, it seems to me, arises when a person fights to defend his opinion, which is based on information which the deputy has been able to, or hopes to obtain. It is more evil if

### DEPUTIES FIGHT WITH POLITICAL, LEGAL AND PROPAGANDA INSTRUMENTS TO REALIZE THEIR OWN SUBJECTIVE GOALS.

Unfortunately I see this sort of tendency in the SC right now. Last spring our commission considered and accepted "The RL Defense Concept." We were convinced of the support of interested organizations by the reviews we received, which were also sent to the defense ministry. Now we want to realize this conceptual framework in the law, "On State Security," but completely different objections are now being raised. There were no other means by which to attain the approval of another framework, so the question was assigned to our commission's newly formed work group for further evaluation. In this group, in which interested persons also work, the question could be resolved as the creator of the group desired, or more precisely, the initiators of the development...

Of course there will be deputies who will not notice the aforementioned tendency. That is only natural, because it is impossible to delve deeply into all questions, and not all arguments can be explained from the rostrum or in the press. In addition, it is sometimes not clear whether anyone wishes to hear my views or the commission's. And it still seems that the voting results often depend not upon arguments, but on who developed the specific proposal.

Of three proposed laws merged into one legislative package ("On Defense of the State," "On Defense Forces," and "On an Extraordinary Situation"), which have already been discussed on their second reading, I will discuss mainly the first. I have often emphasized that I cannot agree that a law should first anticipate creation of some organization, but afterwards a document regulating its activities is enacted. I am speaking here about a structure that would be named the Bureau for the Defense of the Constitution. Of course, we all understand that there remains a problem:

**WE MUST DECIDE WHO WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR STATE SECURITY QUESTIONS, FOR INTELLIGENCE AND FOR COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE.**

The first obstacle arose because we have alongside people who are able to carry out their assignments also those who do only that which they themselves wish to do. In accordance with the conception we put forward that already existing services work on security issues. That was not favored. And so we have created this new service. It seems to me that that requires a group of people who, wishing to decide their own field of activity and functions, seek to fill the "gap" in the concept and law with their own pet ideas. That means major changes in the concept and proposed law, "On Defense of the State." Advancing a completely different proposition:

**LEGISLATORS HAVE FORGOTTEN(?) WHAT THEY THEMSELVES DECIDED AND WITH WHOM THEY AGREED SIX MONTHS AGO.**

One must ask the question: To what degree is that lack of interest by the deputies, and to what degree is a person, a group of people, or an organization turning against the concept?

[Domburs] In turn, it seems to me that it is the appropriate time to ask about the usefulness of the existing service: Is it being taken into account, evaluated?

[Simsons] At this moment we have several services that perform necessary tasks for the state, but of course there is no guarantee that all the tasks will be done, and that several agencies will not take on the same task at the same time. And sometimes it seems to me that the title is more important to some service employees than the contents of the work. At the moment service titles of a general character do not yet indicate service functions. For example, now included in the proposed law, "On Defense of the State" is a concrete name for the service, although such a service does not yet exist, nor is there a law concerning this agency. The proposed law talks about a Bureau for the Defense of the Constitution, but within the framework of defense was the proposal for a state security service. Speaking of both one and the other service, the most important thing would be to assure that the security service in Latvia is UNMILITARIZED, WITHOUT POLICE AND REPRESSIVE FUNCTIONS. The term included in the concept was related to the already existing service, even though in addition to security functions it performs other security functions characteristic of other military formations. To surmount this problem achievement of the security guarantee function required a

new service with a resonant name: the Bureau for the Defense of the Constitution [BDC].

[Domburs] The RL SC Presidium has created a work group that will develop a legislative proposal about this BDC. It seems to me that the chief problem is to assure that a new Chekha is not established. How can we escape from such terror?

[Simsons] The BDC will not become a new Chekha, if the proposals of the defense framework are applied to it. I must add that the SC Presidium has approved a document, which does not relate to the BDC, in which the principles of Chekha functions are completely preserved. The discussion is about the RL Security Agency [SA] statute. We must hope that if the law on the SA is not better, at least it will be different.

[Domburs] How can that be? An agency with a suitable name has already been offered special service functions, yet the next one, the BDC, is already being developed?

[Simsons] It seems to me that the BDC should be developed on the basis of the already existing service. They would be a few tens of people, that would be concerned with summarizing and analyzing information. Unfortunately, my suspicions are well-founded that the BDC will be developed as another special service alongside those already existing or as one standing over them.

[Domburs] Both the SA statute and the BDC work group have been approved by the SC Presidium, to which you yourself belong. Why is such a situation developing with the acceptance of the Presidium?

[Simsons] These questions were not discussed in the Presidium in my presence, they were only voted on. I voted against approval of the SA statute because I believe that unifying such functions is intolerable. In the voting on the DBC work group, I abstained. Its composition, it seems to me, is based upon the principles of corresponding political interests. Irrespective of who comes to power, the armed forces, the police and special services must be outside of politics, they may not work to further the interests of the party in power. Let's remember how it was in the Soviet system, where agencies which were concerned with the protection of state and citizen interests carried out the orders of the Communist party. I do not think that it would be to Latvia's benefit if every party hoping to come to power were to create their own special services.

[Domburs] Speaking of subjectivism and political interests, it seems to me that we cannot ignore the defense and internal affairs commission. Can it be outside politics if its former leader T. Jundzis now is the defense minister, G. Kristovskis is chairman of the Home Guard headquarters, and your vice-chairman, J. Dobelis, according to LAUKU AVIZE, is the Security Agency's political advisor?

[Simsons] We must begin to think that it is not desirable for commission members to have such close personal ties with any of those agencies. In the beginning these errors were unnoticeable. Now due to the poverty of the state and other reasons the interests of these agencies conflict, the negative aspects become clearly apparent, because

**SC COMMISSION MEMBERS MAY NOT HAVE AN INTEREST IN THE PRIORITIES OF THIS OR THAT SERVICE.**

Two of the aforementioned commission members, Jundzis and Kristovskis, were appointed to their present posts by SC decree. It is still sadder that individual deputies take on responsibility for one of the agencies without notifying the commission.

[Domburs] And yet, it is essential that there be a "head" to coordinate the activities of these many agencies.

[Simsons] The defense council, the creation of which is anticipated in the law "On the Security of the State," could take on such functions. The law anticipates that the council would have limited rights, because

**IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS WHO ARE PREOCCUPIED WITH OTHER POLITICAL PROBLEMS WOULD BE ABLE TO FIND THE TIME TO RESOLVE SPECIFIC DEFENSE AND SECURITY QUESTIONS**

I am afraid that the real work will again be done by other groups of people, which will be guided not by professional criteria, but by political criteria and interests. That is why we cannot escape the comparison: We are all pigs at a long trough. There is room for everyone, but there is no herder to direct us to our places. But pigs have varying characters: One steps into the trough with his feet, another is always pushing away the others, trying to find a better spot. And there must be someone with a rod, who puts all into their places. Then everyone will eat and be satisfied. At this moment there is no shortage of those willing "to hold the rod," but I doubt that they would be the best herders.

**Present, Future Defense Needs Viewed**

93UN0422A *Riga PAVALSTNIEKS* in Latvian  
10 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by Juris Kaza: "Juris Kaza on Latvia's Defense"]

[Text] The Latvian press, including PILSONIS, has been debating the issue of the Latvian defense concept. I am by no means a specialist, but I set forth a few propositions.

**Defense is essential**

They say that states have armies. Uninvited foreign armies often are found in such states. Latvia has vast experience with occupations. This experience convinces me that non-resistance is certainly not the path of "least suffering" for a small country.

**Russia is the real, existing and potential enemy of Latvia**

In contrast to Pentagon generals or even Israel's commanders, Latvia does not have to lose sleep over potential future wars and enemy combinations. History teaches that there is only one possible enemy: Russia. Aggression against its neighbors is "in the blood" of Russia as a state. Regardless of everything that has transpired since August 1991, almost nothing has happened to convince us that Russia has changed.

The task of Latvia's defense, therefore, is a completely simple formulation: To assure that even the most brutal Russian "Tsar" will not be willing to pay the price in his people's blood that aggression against Latvia/the Baltic states would require. Latvia's armed forces actually must work only in one direction: To defend the Eastern border on land and in the air and to be prepared to beat back an invasion from Russia. The long-range view of defense tasks should also include the capacity to counterattack, to liberate occupied territory, and to destroy enemy supply lines and infrastructure behind the front's lines.

So long as Kaliningrad remains a part of Russia the assignment of Latvia's Navy, together with that of Lithuania, will be to guard our shores against Russian sea operations from the West.

**Defense forces—today and after the year 2000**

Latvia's defense forces today, together with the country and people, are suffering from the spiritual blight and material poverty created by the occupation. Poverty strongly limits the material provisions and armaments of the defense forces, but that may not hinder bolstering their spirits. Latvia's soldiers must be given a new, tough, sometimes even ruthless training regimen, with the goal of creating a tempered, disciplined, self-confident soldier. He will be a soldier who, driven, prodded, pushed and trained by his instructors will become an equal to the instructors in physical and military preparedness, but will never become their half-slave or object of abuse.

Such a training regimen, at least for Latvia's professional and semi-professional units, could be based on the methods of the U.S. Marine Corps or Britain's elite unit, the Special Air Service (SAS). Their goal is to reshape youths (in the case of the SAS, the "best of the best" experienced soldiers) into self-confident warriors, who are able to carry out their assignments in a professional, even a cold-blooded manner.

Although it is conceivable that Latvian defense forces may someday include rather large units (perhaps mechanized or helicopter landing brigades, rocket artillery and anti-aircraft defense battalions), the primary unit of ground forces could be a platoon, a cohesive, small group of soldiers, which would include various specialties (heavy infantry weapons, communications, sanitation, field engineering), whatever is needed so that the platoon could operate autonomously in case of emergency. Relations among soldiers, instructors, and officers and military knowledge must be such that the platoon cannot be "knocked out of action" with the death of the commander. In principle every corporal should be able to lead this unit into battle. In extraordinary circumstances the platoon should be divisible into three-man cells which could function as snipers, saboteurs, and partisans. So, I mainly subscribe to the view that Latvia's defense forces must be prepared for a partisan war, but not for that alone.

**Preparations for Latvia's defense after the year 2000**

Let's assume that on the tenth anniversary of Latvia's formal reestablishment of independence the country has somewhat normal economic and social conditions. Poverty will no longer be the state's chief problem and Latvia,

## STATE AND LOCAL MILITARY FORCES

JPRS-UMA-92-046  
23 December 1992

together with Lithuania and Estonia, will be able to begin to develop appropriate defense structures. Let's also assume that the defense system heretofore will have averted Russian aggression toward Latvia and repulsed other negative phenomena: raids by gangs and "non-state" private armies.

At about this time, if no miracles have occurred in Russia, the Baltic states will have to begin developing appropriate modern armed forces. They would be as follows:

—An army with completely modern armaments, with an appropriately large number of helicopters and battlefield weapons, as well as artillery and other ground-to-ground intensive and precise bombardment systems (with the task of annihilating the offensive spearhead and destroying their closest rearguard).

—An armed air force with appropriate numbers of reconnaissance bombers and fighters that would be able to defend air space against raids, to provide tactical fire to support ground forces and to carry out certain strategic bombing assignments, for example, destroying supply columns, bridges, railway crossings, fuel depots and other objectives within 500-1,000 kilometers of the Baltic states' borders.

—Naval forces, including submarines, would have the task of guarding the northern and western coasts of the Baltic states against Russian naval operations. Naval forces would be composed chiefly of fast missile boats and missile frigates, minelayers, minesweepers, and ships with underwater detection capabilities. The submarine squadrons must be prepared for the possibility of operating outside the Baltic Sea in extraordinary circumstances (especially with prior warning), operating against Russian shipping in the North Sea and the ocean. Naval forces would also include sea aviation, mainly from the coast and through helicopters armed with anti-ship and anti-submarine weapons based on the larger ships, as well as sea observation and patrol airplanes.

That all adds up to some expensive fun. That is why already today the defense ministry should be creating theoretical and practical work groups, perhaps under the names "Army 2000," "Navy 2000," etc., with the assignment of preparing for the moment when Latvia will be able to supply herself with modern, world-class weapons.

One field of work in which specialists can begin working already tomorrow is ascertaining the operating principles of guided battlefield weapons, which are generally based on the development of electronics and computer programs. Such knowledge would be widely applicable also to civilian industry, for example with "robot vision" used to detect defects on rapidly moving production lines, as well as detecting tanks in a forest. It is already now possible to begin planning preliminary work, let's say anti-tank, anti-radar and anti-infantry missiles so that Latvia would be prepared at the appropriate time not only to buy foreign products, but to offer joint-projects, even assembling, manufacturing or programming battlefield electronics for such systems as the U.S.-made "Maverick" air-to-ground missiles.

A major role in arming Latvia will be played, unfortunately, by what might be called battlefield applicable conventional

weapons of mass destruction. Those who are short on manpower and who value human life must use firepower to compensate for the disadvantage of numbers. One example of these sorts of weapons are the mobile multi-barrelled rocket bombardment systems, which were used in the Gulf war to deliver hurricane fire to Iraqi positions. Other weapons which turn an attacking spearhead into a gravedigger's work field are the so-called cluster bombs and, of course, napalm.

Nothing prevents Latvia's specialists from starting to think now about how to sift out useful items from the huge mountains of munitions tossed away by the Russians, and, let's say, producing the so-called "dumb" aviation bombs from large artillery charges, or even adding electronics and guidance wings to produce a "smart" bomb. One of the most terrifying weapons, called a vacuum bomb, can be produced from large, gasoline cisterns with detonators lifted into the air, which first spreads the appropriate aerosol over a wide area and then ignites it with an explosion that resembles a small format tactical nuclear weapon.

So long as Latvia does not have her own warplanes with these sorts of cheap bombs we might enter the world market, not to earn money from humanity's insatiable disposition toward slaughter, but to supply the "righteous" struggle. Why not sell weapons produced in Latvia, let's say, to Bosnia, if it is financed by the rich Muslim states? It is possible that Africa will have no shortage of conflicts in which small peoples or clans will battle against oppressors and aggressors.

Latvia could seek to obtain artillery from South Africa, which produces the world's best cannon with a 40 kilometer range. With a few such mobile batteries and rapid response helicopter units the entire Eastern border, or at least likely paths of invasion (the Russian, at least with tanks, will not, of course, come through marshes and forest thickets) could be covered.

In fact all the chief weapons systems could be begun to be learned through computer simulations, just as the Latvian/Baltic systems could be planned and simulated. Couldn't the defense ministry purchase a few dozen of the "niftiest" Macintosh work stations and give them to engineering students to begin planning helicopter bodies and cheap, light-weight but durable army automatic rifles?

Those are just a few thoughts of how Latvia could begin to lay the foundation for a defense that is essential with a neighbor like Russia. We can only hope that there is still time for it.

## CAUCASIAN STATES

### **Edict on Postponement of Draft**

*93US0226A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian  
20 Nov 92 p 1*

[“Edict of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic ‘On the Postponement of the Draft Into Military Service’”]

[Text] For the purpose of establishing order in the draft into military service with respect to the partial mobilization declared in the edict of the President of the Azerbaijan

Republic "On the Staffing of the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijan Republic" No. 578 of 19 February 1992 and in accordance with the edicts "On the Draft Into Active Military Service of Reservists Released to the Reserves After Demobilization from the United Armed Forces of the CIS" No. 77 of 25 July 1992 and "On the Draft of Citizens of the Azerbaijan Republic into Active Military Service in October-December 1992" No. 219 of 21 September 1992, I decree that:

1. The draft for the partial mobilization of the conscripts and reservists listed below is to be postponed until a special ruling is issued:

- conscripts with dependent children up to three years of age and with two or more dependent children;
- reservists with four or more dependent children;
- conscripts and reservists who belong to families with two sons where the other son is already in military service;
- conscripts and reservists, whose brothers and fathers were killed or died while they were in military service;
- students in day (fulltime) departments of higher educational institutions;
- graduate students, including those studying through correspondence courses.

2. The Ministry of Defense of the Azerbaijan Republic is to be assigned the task of arranging military service on the home front in the ranks of the Azerbaijan Republic's armed forces for those who are the only son in a family.

3. This law is also to be applied to individuals who were drafted earlier according to the edicts of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic "On the Staffing of the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijan Republic," "On the Draft into Active Military Service of Reservists Released to the Reserves After Demobilization from the United Armed Forces of the CIS," and "On the Draft of Citizens of the Azerbaijan Republic into Active Military Service in October-December 1992."

[Signed] President of the Azerbaijan Republic Abulfaz Elchibey  
Baku, 14 November 1992

#### Discussion of Armenian Efforts To Establish Armed Forces

93UM0217A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
5 Dec 92 p 3

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Konstantin Pitrov: "They Have Played 'To Arms!' in Armenia: One More Republic of the Former USSR Has Seriously Set Out To Create Its Own Armed Forces"]

[Text] Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan published a series of edicts on 26 November which concern defense issues.

One of the edicts introduces contract military service. In this regard, the Government of Armenia has been tasked to approve the provision on contract military service in the

form of a contract and the republic Ministry of Defense must create special subunits of "contract" servicemen within a month.

At the same time the President of Armenia, who according to the Constitution is the commander-in-chief of the republic Armed Forces, made a number of transfers at the highest level of the defense department "to reorganize the Armenian Armed Forces". For example, the post of commander of the Armenian Armed Forces that was created last summer has been eliminated. Armenian First Deputy Minister of Defense Lieutenant-General Norat Ter-Grigoryants who occupied that post headed the republic Ministry of Defense Main Staff.

Observers link these edicts with the acceleration of the military structural development of its own army, which was announced at the end of October when a change of leadership took place in the Ministry of Defense. As we all know, Vazgen Manukyan, one of the advocates of a strict military policy, headed the defense department at that time. It is characteristic that immediately after that, it was as if the Armenian mass media concurred—they now and then mention the name of Vazgen Sarkisyan, the former minister of defense, in the newspaper pages and on the air. They are still criticizing him now: he is incompetent and unprofessional...

Of what is ex-Minister Sarkisyan guilty? And why have they "set out" precisely after him? It seems to me that he is quite likable under current conditions. So, Sarkisyan is accused of not having reacted in a timely manner to the change of the military-political situation. Specifically, he is being accused of the fact that his department perceived with too much indifference the statement of at that time Azerbaijan President Ayaz Mutalibov that the national army of that republic was completely formed based on the inheritance from the Russian Federation 4th Combined Arms Army and is capable of independently protecting its own borders. In response, the Armenian Minister of Defense stated that it was no more than a declaration. And perhaps he was correct—the situation on the fronts of the undeclared Karabakh war have attested to that. But today even the slightest failures of that time are hanging over the former leader of Armenia's military department, just like the Sword of Damocles.

Nevertheless, it is he who stood at the origins of the creation of Armenia's national army. As we have now learned, the operations of the Karabakh forces for the capture of Shusha and Lachina in May 1992 were successfully conducted precisely with his participation. Until this very day, the Azerbaijan Army has been attempting to close the Lachina Corridor that connects Armenia with NKR [Nagorno-Karabakh Region].

The current ex-minister occupied the post of advisor on military issues under President Ter-Petrosyan. Incidentally, no matter how much you criticize Vazgen Sarkisyan, he had enough courage to speak on national television and to explain the reasons that compelled him to leave the post of head of the military department. He frankly admitted that as a result of the increased number of tasks and problems which have been placed before the Ministry of Defense

today during the course of the full-fledged military structural development of the national Armed Forces, he is incapable of handling them.

Vazgen Manukyan who, as you know, replaced him, previously occupied the post of prime minister and then joined the opposition. This autumn he left its ranks and once again entered the government.

The thesis that its own military-industrial complex is needed during the creation of its own army is being cited as the main argument in favor of assigning Manukyan. And who other than the prime minister, who held all the threads of the republic's economic life in his hands for a long time, knows the state of affairs in this sphere and will be able to better deal with the assigned task.

In any case, during the last one and a half months, significant steps have been made on the creation of a national army. According to the Armenian Presidential Edict, conscription of first category reserve officers has been announced in the republic—that is only those individuals who hold the military ranks of junior lieutenant, lieutenant and captain until 45 years of age, major—until 50 years of age, lieutenant colonel—until 55 years of age, colonel—until 60 years of age and, generals—until 65 years of age.

Many reserve officers are going to serve voluntarily. The primary reason is that the salary level of national army servicemen has been raised to the average that has been adopted in the CIS countries. By way of illustration, a platoon commander who holds the rank of junior lieutenant, will receive a salary of R6,200 per month for the post, R2,250 for his rank, and another R1,200 for his food ration. Moreover, Ter-Petrosyan's edict and a government decision have introduced a salary index as a result of price increases and new temporary duty and field payments have been established.

But, on the other hand, conscription into the national army is not causing general enthusiasm. Cases of evasion of the draft using bribes and also simply fleeing from Armenia to nearby countries are well known. Be that as it may, conscription is occurring in Armenia. And the current leaders of the military department are approaching this issue in a quite sound manner. Suffice it to say that officers who have received a military education only at military departments of VUZs [Higher Educational Institutions] will go through special commander training assemblies beforehand.

Those people who are evading the draft are paying a high price. If the republic procurator previously had a sufficiently loyal attitude toward deserters, today 365 cases have been turned over to the Armenian military procuracy. Already 13 men have been convicted of evading military service.

Officers of Armenian nationality from the Russian Army are augmenting the ranks of the Armenian national army.

The Armenian Ministry of Defense suggests devoting primary attention to qualitative training of servicemen because the republic is not capable of building the multi-echelon defense based on the scheme adopted in the former Soviet Union—the multilayered system of consistent deployment

of units from the line of the state border in the entire depth of the operational rear areas. The reason is the size of the state's territory. Therefore, the creation of major, and therefore, inert division-sized and larger units makes no sense. Armenia is planning to create units with a high degree of mobility. A brigade with a strength of from 1,500-2,500 men consisting of 3-4 battalions is the best form of that.

A transition to formation based on the already existing structures (former "Tigran Mets" and "Susantsi David" detachments, "Dashnaktsutyuk" armed formations and the Arabo team) of brigades that are similar to the airborne brigades of the former Soviet Army is possible in Armenia in the very near future, but with recruitment of personnel on a contract basis. One of these brigades is already being formed in Stepanazan. Mandatory military specialty training of pre-conscription age youth is already being conducted on a mandatory basis based on the former DOSAAF.

They plan to send young men who have received combat experience in Karabakh to military schools in Russia, Kazakhstan and in other CIS countries, and they also plan to create accelerated officer courses. The need has been recognized to train specialists on protection of the state border based on the Russian Border Troops and creation of their own PVO [Air Defense] system that includes an intelligence system.

All of that attests to the fact that Armenia has seriously set out to create its own Armed Forces.

## CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

### Turkmenistan Military Appointments

*93UM0209B Ashgabat TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA  
in Russian 26 Oct 92 p 2*

[Turkmenistan President S. Niyazov edict of 25 October 1992 conferring military ranks; parens around letter in a name indicate poor legibility]

[Text]

### Edict of President of Turkmenistan

#### on Conferring Military Ranks

Confer military ranks as follows:

#### Colonel

Lieutenant Colonel Amangelyyev, Annageldy; Lieutenant Colonel Yevgrafov, Valeriy Vladimirovich; Lieutenant Colonel Yevdokimov, Aleksandr Maksimovich; Lieutenant Colonel Zaykov, Sergey Petrovich; Lieutenant Colonel Kurmaz, Viktor Pavlovich; Lieutenant Colonel Kozrev, Vladimir Nikolayevich; Lieutenant Colonel Kornev, Igor Mikhaylovich; Lieutenant Colonel Mishchenko, Sergey Vasilyevich; Lieutenant Colonel Neupokoyev, Vasiliy Nikolayevich; Lieutenant Colonel Nesmeyanov, Sergey Fedorovich; Lieutenant Colonel Sgadnik, Nikolay Nikolayevich; Lieutenant Colonel Tyrenkov, Igor Sergeyevich; Lieutenant Colonel Cholokhyan, Yuriy Tarasovich; Lieutenant Colonel Kharichkov, Aleksandr Ivanovich;

**Lieutenant Colonel**

Major Alekseyev, Aleksandr Petrovich; Major Agafonkin, Sergey Veniaminovich; Major Belskiy, Yury Leonidovich; Major Bushanskiy, Yury Alekseyevich; Major Veselov, Eduard Vladimirovich; Major Grinyayev, Sergey Glebovich; Major Danilenko, Vladimir Alekseyevich; Major Dav(y)dik, Valentin Anatolyevich; Major Demchenko, Vladimir Ivanovich; Major Ionov, Sergey Borisovich; Major Kotenko, Viktor Yakovlevich; Major Kostyn, Vladimir Yuryevich; Major Kurbanayazov, Roman Payzyyevich; Major Kashlachev, Viktor Ignatyevich; Major Manannikov, Aleksey Leonidoviy; Major Nakonechnyy, Valeriy Bogdanovich; Major Oleynik, Anatoliy Vasilyevich; Major Pushik, Yury Aleksandrovich; Major Rota(ch)ov, Aleksandr Vasilyevich; Major Ryzhkov, Aleksey Petrovich; Major Ryabov, Igor Valentinovich; Major Suvorov, Yury Nikolayevich; Major Kharitonov, Dmitriy Vasilyevich; Major Shushkov, Ivan Mikhaylovich; Major Yukhin, Vladimir Aleksandrovich; Major Khatamov, Atamurad Allayevich.

[Signed] President of Turkmenistan S. Niyazov  
Ashgabat, 25 October 1992

**Turkmenistan Law on Military Service Discussed**  
*93UM0209C Ashgabat TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA*  
in Russian 31 Oct 92 p 8

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) Tore Torayev, jurist: "Once More About Military Legislation"]

[Text] *It is emphasized in the Turkmenistan Constitution that the republic has its own Armed Forces for defending state sovereignty and service in them is the sacred duty of everyone. Universal military obligation has been established for males which prevails over other constitutional obligations of citizens.*

In my opinion, in upcoming legislation on universal military obligation it is necessary to concretize questions of overall organization of the Armed Forces, their manpower acquisition methods, the procedure for training and performance of military duty, the rights, obligations and responsibility of servicemen and reservists, and relations in other spheres of military life. It is necessary to precisely define the granting of draft deferment for purposes of social protection of citizens' interests, considering ethnic and other features

here. For example, families with many children, the age of parents and presence of breadwinners must not be forgotten. These points were not always taken into account in the former Union's law.

Of course, something already has been done in this regard. In particular, a Turkmenistan Presidential Edict provides for granting draft deferments from active military duty to draftees working as shepherds (cowherds, horseherds) and also working as their assistants on distant pastures in desert, mountainous and waterless areas. A Turkmenistan Presidential Edict also was issued promptly and advisably on alternative service.

The young Turkmenistan Armed Forces also need a status of servicemen and their social and legal protection in which it is necessary to emphasize that service is a special form of state activity demanding heavy loads and difficult ordeals. Therefore it is necessary for the state to provide compensation for military labor. One also should think about developing new combined-arms regulations and statutes on servicemen's material liability, on the disciplinary battalion, on officer military ranks and so on.

Recently a Presidential Edict established the Military Faculty at Turkmenistan State University imeni Magtymguly. This indicates steadfast concern for the Turkmenistan Armed Forces by Saparmurat Atayevich Niyazov. Such a decision will permit us to train officer cadres on a timely basis. In the future it is necessary to be concerned with the growth of general officers. Further, soldiers' service begins with the Military Oath. Development of the new text of the oath and the procedure for taking it demand a special approach which considers our state's national features.

Servicemen who have served the prescribed period now are being discharged to the reserve and the young generation is being called up. Troop combat readiness will depend on the quantitative and qualitative conduct of this campaign. And here one cannot forget the role of legal propaganda at military commissariat induction and assembly centers. From the first days the future soldiers must be familiarized with requirements of laws, and especially with servicemen's rights and obligations. Those military commissariats are acting properly which have set up legal knowledge reading rooms and have close contact with lawyers.

Defense of the homeland is a concern not just of people with shoulderboards. It is a job of all the people.

**DEFENSE INDUSTRY****Tbilisi Aviation Plant Said To Provide Su-25s to Georgia**

*93UM0224A Moscow KURANTY in Russian 21 Oct 92 p 1*

[Article from Tbilisi by Guga Lolishvili under rubric "The Political Wings": "Georgia Has Its Own Attack Aircraft"]

[Text] Despite an atmosphere of acute secrecy surrounding the Tbilisi Aircraft Plant, now and then a sensational report will flit through the press regarding another lot of combat aircraft marked "Made in Tbilisi."

The Tbilisi Aircraft Plant imeni Dimitrov (that is what it was called in Soviet times) has functioned in Tbilisi since 1943, when the enterprise was evacuated from Taganrog. Yak aircraft were assembled in plant shops during World War II and later MiG-21 fighters were produced in Tbilisi. As a KURANTY correspondent learned from a trustworthy source, aircraft assembled in Tbilisi in Soviet times were exported; in particular, they were actively purchased by such countries as Finland, Cuba, India and Vietnam.

In the last year the Tbilisi Aircraft Plant has been producing Su-25 attack aircraft, but the Su-27 model is not assembled in Tbilisi. As affirmed by various sources, such attack aircraft are produced by a similar plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. In connection with Moscow stopping delivery of parts and instruments, the aircraft plant now is capable of supporting the assembly only of one Su-25 a month. The prime cost of such an aircraft is one hundred million rubles. All these aircraft are intended exclusively for bringing the Georgian Air Force up to strength, and so the possibility of Tbilisi aircraft being used in Nagorno-Karabakh as well as in other hot spots is essentially precluded. According to the KURANTY correspondent's data, Su-25 aircraft in the Georgian Air Force inventory were assembled at the Tbilisi Aircraft Plant. As the correspondent was informed in the republic Air Force Directorate, the Russian Army did not transfer a single military aircraft to Georgia.

**Omsk Tank Plant Awaits License To Sell Tractors**

*93UM0224B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Nov 92 p 4*

[RIA article under rubric "In Brief": "Excess' Tanks Are Being Sold"]

[Text] Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy called the "Transportation Machinebuilding Plant" Association the pride of the nation during his recent visit to Omsk. Its principal products are T-82 tanks, which in the opinion of specialists have no analogues in the world. Today the enterprise is "sitting on its card file" and some subunits have been shifted to a shortened work day. The Ministry of Defense sharply reduced the volume of orders and tanks are standing right in the shops. Meanwhile, if "excess" tanks are sold abroad, over \$20 billion can be earned—approximately as much as the International Monetary Fund promised Russia.

The enterprise is ready to master production of Belarus tractors and independently earn funds necessary for this if it receives a license from the government of Russia for selling its armored products.

**DOCTRINAL ISSUES****Gen Rodionov Decries Passivity of Military Science**

*93UM0198B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Dec pp 2,3*

[Article by Col-Gen Igor Rodionov: "Military Science: To Serve But Not Be Subservient"]

[Text] Historical experience teaches that the success of reforms in any sphere of human endeavor is determined by the attitude of the reformers to science, by their capacity to avoid repeating the mistakes of their predecessors. A real science, one which is freed from political and ideological dogmas and from voluntaristic features, is capable of imparting genuine knowledge and true reference points to practice. Perhaps, had the politicians not neglected i, this science, would have saved us from many of those troubles which we are now experiencing.

Unfortunately, one must speak of these truisms because the process of reform, including that occurring in the sphere of military development, is everywhere coming up against unsolved scientific problems. To be specific, speaking of military science, it is timidly engaged in this process right now, as if it expects some outside impetus. The Warsaw military-political alliance and the USSR have already ceased their existence, there are no unified Armed Forces. National armies are being formed, and in some areas are acquiring their first "combat experience." Virtually uncontrolled conversion is doing irreparable damage to the defense capability of the country. To this point the state has no complete codex of laws regulating the life and activity of the Armed Forces and the defense complex. But science stands mute, rather than speaking out loud of the need to strengthen the might of Russia, a might which should be based not on quantitative but on qualitative indices, a might which should threaten no one, but play the role of deterrent factor against any attempt at aggravation. Military scientists simply must find their place in this work, and in the process allow for historical experience and its lessons.

What does a critical analysis of the development of military science in the period from the 60s to the 80s tell us today?

We know that in this period Soviet military science made a significant contribution to development of the theory of military art and to the development of the Armed Forces. In those same years, theories were devised on the conduct of a world nuclear war in response to the threat of massed use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. and the NATO bloc, and on the preparation and conduct of modern operations and combat actions by formations and units of all combat arms and forces. The Armed Forces acquired new regulations and orders . . . Thus the assertions of an alleged lag, about a stagnation of military science, are clearly unfounded. At the cost of enormous efforts by the people, we succeeded in

assuring the high defense capability of the country and the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, and in achieving and reliably maintaining parity with the U.S. and NATO countries. The contribution of military scientists to this cause is indisputable.

At the same time, military science, like many other sciences, acquired a touch of subjectivism and voluntarism, the wholesale bureaucratism inherent in the sociopolitical system of the state. How was this specifically manifested?

**FIRST.** The mechanical trailing along of military science in the rear guard of policy, at times heedless of its subordination to the political situation.

In the late 50s and early 60s, the political leadership of the country concluded that a future war, if it became reality, would of necessity be a nuclear war with massed use of nuclear weapons. And military science, striving to justify this thesis, proved that combat actions using conventional weapons had virtually become extinct, and that victory could be achieved in a world nuclear war.

Following this, as we recall, there came a sharp cut in the Ground Forces, Air Force and Navy, and ground-attack aircraft, long-range bombers, many surface ships, and some other types of weapons and combat equipment were scrapped.

The reliance on massed use of nuclear weapons in a possible war led to a serious underestimation of defense as an important type of combat action, especially a strategic defense. Here is what the book *The Strategy of Nuclear War* published under the editorship of Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinkovskiy, asserted in 1964: "The conditions of nuclear war do not allow us to choose between defense and offense; they force us to make the choice between offense or defeat. Consequently even the promotion of a strategic defense in a nuclear war is tantamount to defeat." The defense was acknowledged to be expedient only on the operational scale, and in the governing documents on the organization and conduct of operations and combat actions of troops there is a hint of a frivolous approach toward determining the tasks of operational and tactical formations and their deadlines.

Similar errors were observed in the views of the offensive operation. In the 60s a front operation was planned for a depth of 1,000 km or more, with rates of advance of up to 100 km per day, and for tank armies even 150 km per day.

Despite the sharp criticism from many military scientists and practitioners, these propositions were given shape in combat regulations and orders on the conduct of operations. Troops and staffs were trained, operational plans were made, and military cadres were taught in accordance with them. In the course of operational training of staffs and combat training of troops, these errors were repeatedly disseminated in command-staff exercises, troop exercises, and maneuvers. In accordance with the concepts of the leadership, plans were to deliver an incredible number of nuclear strikes on troops and rear installations during operations (on a front up to 600, on an army up to 100-120), after which the troops were required, in minimal time, to

restore combat readiness and continue to execute all their missions. Under such conditions, commanding generals, commanders, and staffs were forced to adapt, strove to guess the plans of their superior officers, and lost their way in cliche and show.

This style came so firmly into practice that even now the habit of blindly following the conclusions of high politics stays with us. For example, the striving of a number of military leaders and scientists to justify the alleged need for a pronounced defensive tendency in actions by our troops in a possible war today cannot be explained by anything but the political climate. After acknowledging the concept of a uniform, whole, non-nuclear, non-violent world, whose realization in the future is not even a prospect, we have proclaimed the priority of general human values and have undertaken not to fight a war on foreign territory under any circumstances. We have threatened an aggressor, in the worst case, with expulsion from our land. The line of the state border has become the boundary for advance of our troops when they crush an invading adversary. The offense as a type of combat action has been placed under ban.

Not only has there been no science, there has not even been any common sense in all of these exercises, and we have been obliged to carry out instructions and devise "great" science in the spirit of general precepts. Quite recently we have been persistently introducing them to the academic training process.

**SECOND.** Subjectivism and voluntarism of military leadership with respect to science as a reflection of general style.

The result of the bureaucratic system of governing the country which developed when there was not even the slightest real criticism from society and no opposition forces was that the position of leaders of all ranks became unshakable, their authority unquestionable, their power virtually unbounded. The leaders sat for decades in their jobs and only a miracle or death could remove them from the posts they occupied.

The Armed Forces copied this system. Of course the style did not bypass the sphere of military science. As a rule the "most scientific" principles could be uttered only by the chief officer, and he was the one who determined the level of scientificness of the theoretical propositions of his subordinates. Perhaps only in our military science have the most outstanding miliary theorists, the "leading lights" of military thought" always been ministers of defense and commanders-in-chief and chiefs of large staffs. You see, it became the rule here that each new leader of highest rank was obliged to publish a fat book, necessarily one with pretensions as a scientific work. It is no secret that by no means all the writings of this type were written by the authors listed on the title pages, while the real authors of these ephemeral works were reviewers and assistants, nameless toilers. For known reasons they were bound by general precepts and did not possess full information, and since they often worked on order rather than from the heart, the product they put out was often of poor quality and dull, while the incontestability of the judgments of the highest leaders virtually closed the door on independent research.

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Individual, major theoretical studies disappeared. They were replaced by collective, multi-author works which had been "groomed" by the editors. As a result of such creativity, we have no Dragomirovs, Svechins or Triandofilovs today.

**THIRD.** The isolation of Soviet military science from foreign military scientific thought.

In the period of active confrontation between two military political alliances, this was quite natural. Although one cannot say that we were not interested in the attainments of military science of the countries of the West. The works of certain American and West German scholars also appeared here, individual articles from periodicals, and the regulations and orders of the armed forces of the U.S., FRG and France were translated. In recent years the military leadership has regularly been briefed with the necessary military-technical and military-political information. Special groups were even created in the structure of the control organs for the collection, analysis and accumulation of information.

However there was no systematized study of the problems of foreign military art. At that time one could not even imagine an exchange of scientific research and literature on military problems with the armies of developed states, or the conduct of joint seminars on military-political topics, or participation in exercises and maneuvers and so forth. What is more, for a long time we viewed new attainments in the field of military art of other countries with the superior attitude of victors of the last world war. Everyone remembers, for example, our disdainful attitude toward the development of the theory of mobile defense, nuclear artillery, cruise missiles, the development of mobile quick-reaction forces, the theory of local wars, development of precision weapons, and automated command and control systems for troops and weapons.

At the same time, the absence of systematic study of foreign experience, military art, military development, and the development of weapons and combat equipment has sometimes led to the reverse phenomena: we blindly rushed to copy western experience.

**FOURTH.** Poor attention to development of a methodological base of military science itself.

By selecting the development of the Armed Forces and armed struggle as its subject, military science abandoned the other problems of military development (political leadership of the national defense, military-economic development, civil and territorial defense, organization of ideological support of the defense sphere, etc.) to other sciences. As a result many of these problems did become part of social, natural or technical science, but were resolved on an empirical level. There has been no unified system of sciences or scientific theories of war as a whole or of the military development of the state, and incidentally, [such a system] has still not been developed. Scientific research institutes and academies often duplicated one another's work. Attempts to create at least some centers and organizations which might collect, synthesize and analyze military-political and other information about the defensive sphere as a whole have not found support.

And finally, we are also obliged to extract vital lessons from the experience of the post in the field of cadre policy, especially the training of military cadres.

Training of generals and officers in our military academies and schools basically boiled down to teaching them to fight and to command and control troops in battles and operations. On the one hand, this has to be studied, but at the same time, as experience has shown, it is clearly not enough. A profound study of the organization of activity of tactical and operational formations of the Armed Forces in peacetime is virtually left out of the training programs, although it would seem this should comprise a most important part of training of officers and generals. This is especially necessary under modern conditions, when the commanders of units, tactical formations, and operational formations must coordinate many questions regarding support of troop actions with the organs of state authority.

I believe that one weak aspect in the training of students of military academies has been the excessive enthusiasm for the military gaming method, command-staff exercises, group classes etc, and "coaching" of the trainees to execute the duties defined by a particular order or staff position. And there has been no time for the broad, general and special military training in which the military academies should be involved.

The quality of training of military cadres, as is known, depends on the level of qualification of the instructors. And here it is, in connection with the adoption of the Statute on Defense, which established the maximum age of service in the Armed Forces of the Russian federation, that a very urgent situation has arisen. A great many professors and teachers are subject to discharge, or have already been discharged, with the result that the scientific potential of the academic institutions has been sharply undermined. Specially qualified scientific councils face the threat of self-liquidation due to the absence of an adequate number of doctors of science. Many scientist and specialists of unusual professions have gone away.

Incidentally, the situation with respect to the cadres of military scientists and teachers in the Academy of the General Staff, on whom special requirements are imposed, is also alarming. Each instructor here must graduate from this academy and gain some experience in working in large staffs or in command positions at the operational-strategic level. Otherwise, because of the specific nature of the academy he cannot be a full-fledged pedagogue. Assignment to a teaching work occurs at the age of 45-47. His development as a teacher and scientist takes another 3-5 years, but by this time his service in the army is ended.

I think that general approaches are not acceptable in this case. I see the solution first of all in raising the maximum time in service for scientific teaching cadres of a higher military school, and secondly in allowing them to stay in their teaching positions after discharge to the reserve or retirement, with retention of the pay level of their position.

Thus experience teaches that for all the dependence of war on politics, and of military development on the political and economic structure of the state, these phenomena and

processes possess some independence, so that military science cannot blindly justify any whim of the political leadership; it must follow its own laws and principles.

For coordination of a whole group of scientific studies on war and military development, clearly we must create a unified center. A special department of the Russian Academy of Sciences might serve in this capacity. It could make a profound scientific analysis of the whole system of military-political relations in the world, develop a general theory of security, military policy, military economics, the problems of military development, and participation of the Armed Forces in prevention of wars, theoretical problems of the integrated defense of the country. It could be assigned the task of coordinating military science research of many scientific research institutes and the work of design bureaus of the defensive sphere etc. It might include a section for geopolitics and security of the Academy of Natural Sciences of the Russian Federation.

In general I believe that the time has come to return to a discussion of problems affecting the structure and content of military science, to clarify its subject, purpose, functions and tasks under the new conditions.

### MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

**Vinogradov on Marines in Mogadishu**  
93UM0263A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
12 Dec 92 p 2

[Article by Viktor Vinogradov: "Aid Has Been Sent to Somalia"]

[Text] So, the first 1,700 American Marines have landed in Mogadishu and have begun to prepare a base for the arrival of the entire contingent of American troops that will total 28,000 men. They didn't encounter any armed resistance whatsoever. News agencies report that relative order has already been established in the city. The Marines have ensured unimpeded access from Mogadishu for motor vehicle columns with food. An aircraft, which delivered 17 tons of food, could land in Mogadishu for the first time in the last six weeks.

At the same time, the multinational forces led by the United States continue to establish control over ever newer areas of Somalia. So, American Marines have occupied the airport at Bale Dogle which is 25 kilometers from the capital. Incidentally, that is a change to the initial operations plan, in accordance with which they proposed to airlift troops to Baidoa immediately after Mogadishu. They had to adjust the plan since the take-off and landing strip there turned out to be two and a half times shorter than the one at Bale Dogle. Armed groups that oppose the Somali clans were destroyed in the area of the airfield and the first military transport aircraft have already landed there.

In Mogadishu itself, where sporadic exchanges of fire sometimes break out, American soldiers are conducting searches of homes while looking for weapons. On 10 December, Commander of the U.S. Operations in Somalia Lieutenant General P. Johnston arrived in the city. He is setting up his

headquarters in the former U.S. embassy building which was closed two years ago. Marines occupied the embassy the day before his arrival and hoisted the American Flag over it. They report that this is the same flag that was on the flagpole near the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983.

Today, the American soldiers must provide an escort for the first transport of food-laden cargo vehicles to Baidoa, which is located 125 kilometers from Mogadishu. Attempts to deliver humanitarian cargoes there by land were halted after a 34-vehicle column found itself in an ambush set up by one of the armed groups and only one vehicle managed to reach the city. According to press agency reports, up to 100 people per day are dying from hunger in Baidoa. From there, U.S. troops will operate along three axes with the goal of establishing control over Oddur, Belet Uen, and Gailalassi.

The first incident with the participation of multinational force servicemen, during which French soldiers and American Marines shot and killed two and wounded seven Somalis near Mogadishu Airport on 10 December, caused a contradictory reaction among the local inhabitants. "If those people killed were guerrillas, that will be in Somalia's favor," said journalists who were eyewitnesses to the incident. "But if they were peaceful residents, the foreigners committed a most foul deed." According to the soldiers' version, they opened return fire on a truck which had attempted to break through an entry control point without stopping. However, it turned out that there were no weapons in the vehicle that crashed into a stone wall.

### SECURITY SERVICES

**Ukraine's Col-Gen Hubenko on Border Security**  
93UM0205 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian  
30 Oct 92 p 9

[Interview with Colonel-General Valeriy Oleksandrovych Hubenko, chairman of the State Committee for Affairs of Protecting the State Border of Ukraine and Commander-in-Chief of the Border Troops of Ukraine, by Petro Medvid: "The State Has Borders and Someone to Defend Them"]

[Text]

[P. Medvid] Valeriy Oleksandrovych, we are living at an unusual time today, and are participants in—rather than just observers of—the process of emergence of the statehood of Ukraine. The legislation on the border troops and the state border was among the first to be adopted in our independent state. A year has passed since then; what is new that has appeared in the Border Troops of Ukraine today?

[V.O. Hubenko] The crucial task of the military defense of the state borders, as is generally known, has been entrusted by the Supreme Soviet and President of Ukraine to the Border Troops.

The fundamental principles of the military-service activity of our troops were legislatively codified by the Supreme Soviet in the laws "The Border Troops of Ukraine" and "The State Border of Ukraine." These laws reflect the fundamentally new stance of Ukraine on questions of ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our

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state. This stance is passionately approved and brought to life by the soldiers, non-commissioned officers, officers and generals of the Border Troops of Ukraine, who have sworn their loyalty to the peoples of Ukraine with great patriotic excitement.

I would note, by the way, that Ukraine has one of the longest borders in Europe—7,572 km [kilometers]. The Border Troops also protect the maritime economic zone in the Black Sea, and that area exceeds 20,000 square kilometers.

The State Committee for Affairs of Protecting the State Border of Ukraine was created after the adoption of the legislation on the Border Troops, and three Directorates were formed—the Southwestern (Lvov), the Southern (Odessa) and the Southeastern (Kharkiv). The standard organizational structure of the formations and units of the Border Troops was revised.

A great deal of work was carried out to fulfill the Edict of the President of Ukraine, "Measures Pertaining to the Protection of the State Border of Ukraine with the Republic of Moldova." We can report today that the Ukrainian-Moldovan border has been brought under control.

Preparations are now underway for the signing of border treaties and their regimes with the Republic of Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Romania. Meetings have been held with the commanders of the border troops of those countries, and preliminary agreement has been reached on the signing of the corresponding agreements.

The delimitation period for the border regime has been completed, and a great deal of work is being done to fulfill the directive of the President of Ukraine "Border-Customs Control at the State Border of Ukraine With the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation." A conceptual framework for the protection of the border and the maritime economic zone has been developed in our committee in accordance with the current policy of Ukraine.

We are constantly aware, by the way, of the active assistance of the Supreme Soviet and its commissions, the Cabinet of Ministers and the concerned agencies of Ukraine. We would like to express our heartfelt gratitude to all of them for that.

**[P. Medvid] The socio-political situation in many regions of the former union remains unsettled. The armed conflict in the Dniester region has evoked particularly serious alarm in the past. What steps have been taken by the command of the Border Troops to strengthen the Ukrainian-Moldovan border?**

**[V.O. Hubenko]** Events in the Dniester region really did evoke serious alarm among the people of Ukraine. And that is not surprising, since a genuine civil war was going on near our borders, people were being killed and cities and towns were burning. Our President signed the edict "Measures to Protect the State Border of Ukraine With the Republic of Moldova" on March 17 of this year, due to the worsening situation in the regions of the Republic of Moldova bordering Ukraine and a situation that threatened the life and health of citizens of Ukraine.

The Border Troops, together with the MVS [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the NGU, had covered the most important sectors of the Ukrainian-Moldovan border as early as March 20. The main assignment given to the troops was ensuring the territorial integrity and inviolability of our borders, defending the population of the regions bordering Moldova and not permitting the use of our territory by the forces of the opposing sides, as well as curtailing any violations of the border. The units of the Border Troops reached the state border before July 1, and had set about protecting it by July 20. Three border-control detachments were formed in quite a short time and were stationed in Mohylev-Podilskyy, Kotovsk and Berezhno.

All of the units were reinforced with armored vehicles, taking into account that the armed conflict flared up in regions that are directly adjoining the border of Ukraine.

The Border Troops, together with the bodies of MVS and NGU of Ukraine, removed more than 700 firearms and a large quantity of ammunition and contraband, including strategic raw materials. The Border Troops of Ukraine, in short, successfully handled their assignments.

We still have a great many problems at the Ukrainian-Moldovan border at the same time. The principal one is the lack of amenities for the border posts, which were moved to new base locations in the summer. Many of them virtually sprang up on bare ground. Decisive steps are being taken now to create at least minimal conditions for the everyday living of the troops.

**[P. Medvid] The President of Ukraine, as we know, recently signed the directive "Border-Customs Control of the State Border of Ukraine With the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation." What do you have to say about that important document?**

**[V.O. Hubenko]** That document really is important. And it was adopted at a very good time, since the situation at our borders with Russia and Belarus have taken shape in such a way that Ukraine has become a kind of corridor through which criminal elements are trying to bring contraband, weapons and drugs across despite the law. And there cannot be two ways of thinking here—the border must be brought under control.

Another element of this problem consists of the fact that hundreds of citizens from Vietnam, India, Korea, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan are rushing across the territory of Ukraine to the countries of Western Europe. Almost 900 such violators who had come from Russia without visas were detained at our borders this year alone.

Yet another important factor is the economic one. Presently, when there is chaos and confusion in the market, when domestic goods, building materials and non-ferrous metals are illegally being exported to neighboring states, we can scarcely hope for success if we do not organize control of the border of Ukraine with the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus.

But that should not worry people—we do not intend to fence ourselves off from our neighbors with barbed wire. The directive of the President clearly states the organization

of border-customs control. And that will in no way complicate the lives of the people who live at the border. Passage across the state border does not require a visa for citizens of Russia and Belarus if they have a passport. The passage of the citizens of other countries is in accordance with international treaties.

[P. Medvid] People will clearly be playing a decisive role in the reliability of the protection of the state border. What personnel problems trouble the State Committee for Affairs of Protecting the State Border of Ukraine today? And what do you intend to do so as to remove the growing social tensions from the formations and units?

[V.O. Hubenko] You are right—our greatest wealth is people. And they are experiencing considerable burdens today. That pertains in particular to the commanders, who bear the greatest responsibility for the protection of the state border.

There are many duties that have priority in my official activity as the commander of the Border Troops of Ukraine. One of them is working with the officer cadres. The fulfillment of the tasks that face the troops depends a great deal on how we resolve it. A situation has taken shape today wherein the manning of the formations and units, especially newly created ones, is taking place using officers transferred from other border districts of the CIS. These people need time, if only to learn the situation at their new service location. I will not conceal the fact that we are also troubled by problems of strengthening military discipline of a particular nature, eliminating the remnants of disciplinary violations and abuses of authority and official position. There was a serious discussion about that at the collegium of the Committee for Improving Work With the Officer Cadres. A program to strengthen the defects in the system of indoctrinating and training the officer corps has been developed.

The conditions are still bad, as I have already indicated, at the Ukrainian-Moldovan sectors of the border—amenities are poor for domestic life, the wives of many officers cannot find work for themselves, there is not enough food for the children... When talking with people at the Kotovsk detachment for border control, I saw that not all of the young officers were accustomed to overcoming difficulties and displaying a businesslike energy in setting up their everyday life. If you recall, it was far worse for us officers in the older generation! And there was nothing for it—we managed ourselves. These are different times, of course, society is changing and people are changing as well. The lieutenants want more attention paid to them, including on issues connected with housing, everyday life and service. All of

that is as it should be. But how can they be helped? We have to pull every lever to see that the family of a young officer lives no worse at the border posts than under the local conditions.

The greatest problem with regard to this issue, as before, is housing. We have to provide it for all officers and warrant officers. The government of Ukraine is doing everything to see that the Border Troops do not remain unnoticed. We are not napping ourselves, either. We are looking for contractors and putting up housing and official buildings using our own resources.

[P. Medvid] Valeriy Oleksandrovych, you have a great deal of life's experience behind you, and the fates of hundreds of officers have passed before your eyes. What do you value in people, and what do you feel is most important in the service of the border soldier?

[V.O. Hubenko] I value decency, honesty and diligence in the performance of their military duty in people first and foremost. Sometimes an honest and decent person lives and serves worse because he does everything honestly, not yielding in conscience. I have a respectful attitude toward such people. And as for those who "connive," abuse their situation and play the hypocrite in the process of their service activity, they must be dealt with in a principled and harsh manner. I feel that adherence to principle in evaluating oneself and one's service colleagues is also an excellent quality of human nature. I repeat, I value decency in people first of all. I cannot stand lying and covering up the state of affairs.

And as for what is most important in service as a border soldier? For me, they are high professionalism, purposefulness in the attainment of a goal and the ability to be self-possessed in any, even the worst, situation.

The border service is a special type of military activity, where the chief weapon is first and foremost good professional skills, alertness and good combat proficiency, which are united in a constant readiness to enter a conflict with an armed violator and gain the advantage over him.

Constant readiness to fulfill the Oath of Loyalty to the Peoples of Ukraine and the constitutional and official duty to protect and defend the state border are the essence of all of the military-service activity of the Border Troops of Ukraine.

[P. Medvid] Thank you for the interview. Heartfelt congratulations in the name of the readers to you and your subordinates on Border Guard Day. Good fortune and good and lasting health to you!

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